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ABSTRACT 
During the mid-1990s, the U.S. Navy initiated a wide-ranging series of Department of 
Defense (DOD) acquisition reforms. Amid this environment of DOD acquisition reform, 
the U.S. Navy started the Virginia-class submarine program and San Antonio-class 
amphibious transport dock ship program. Both of these programs sought to reduce 
ownership costs of these new vessels. 
This study compares the Virginia-class submarine and San Antonio-class ship 
across platforms and across time in order to find those factors that appear to affect cost. 
This study isolates those key metrics and relationships that demonstrate an apparently 
significant impact on affordability. The purpose of this study is to find the programmatic 
decisions, environmental circumstances or managerial tools that benefit or jeopardize 
affordability in a consistent manner, and recommend further study in those areas most 
likely to promote the development of better practices for affordability throughout a 
program’s life cycle. 
The results of this study indicated that the interpretation of affordability changes 
across the life cycle phases of an acquisition program; however, the factors that affected 
cost between the Virginia-class submarine and the San Antonio-class ship were 
comparable across time. The overall findings of affordability across time and between 
these two acquisition programs were mixed. During the pre-acquisition stage, key 
elements, which accept a high degree of cost-growth risk, do not appear to be sufficiently 
responsive to cost-growth mitigation initiatives. The findings suggest that, in the 
acquisition stage, it is possible to reverse cost-growth by setting a non-negotiable cost 
target and establishing all other factors as flexible. For the sustainment stage, analysis of 
the cost effectiveness of an acquisition system’s design is limited by the degree of 
consistency between operational events and program assumptions and the percentage of 
life-cycle completion that are supported by actual cost. The sustainment costs to date 
reflect a successful reduction of total ownership costs for the Virginia-class submarine, 
and inconclusive findings of cost effectiveness for the San Antonio-class ship. 
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The Virginia-class submarine program and the San Antonio-class amphibious 
transport dock ship program both began within a year of each other, and both were 
considered pilot programs for various Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition reform 
initiatives. Both vessels were conceived and designed in a post–Cold War environment 
that has faced increasing degrees of fiscal constraint. The U.S. Navy’s nuclear-powered 
Virginia-class submarine displaces 7,900 tons of water, about one-third the displacement 
of the non-nuclear San Antonio-class ship (25,000 tons). Though differing in many key 
factors, such as displacement, mission set, capabilities, modularity, and more, these two 
vessels share surprisingly similar narratives. 
The Virginia-class and San Antonio-class efforts to reduce total ownership costs 
(RTOC) have become models for future programs. This study explores the effort in depth 
to answer several questions, including the following:  
 Can Virginia-class submarines be validly compared with San Antonio-
class ships? 
 What does affordability mean for the Virginia-class submarine and the San 
Antonio-class ship programs? 
 How should factors affecting affordability be categorized for these 
programs? 
 What common and/or disparate mix of enablers and decisions drives 
affordability? 
 How is affordability measured? 
 How much more or less affordable does a program need to be to merit 
future study? 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
As the DOD has acquired and operated increasingly more technologically 
advanced and complex ships and submarines, costs for new vessels have tended to grow. 
During the past few decades, the DOD has established and implemented numerous 
acquisition reform initiatives intended to increase affordability in the acquisition and the 
sustainment of DOD weapon systems. Notably, the current costs for Virginia-class 
submarines are less than costs for their predecessor vessels (Los Angeles-class and 
Seawolf-class), and the current sustainment costs for San Antonio-class amphibious 
transports appear to be equivalent to their predecessor vessels (Austin-class). The unique 
mix of enabling circumstances and methodologies encountered and employed by the 
Virginia-class and San Antonio-class programs contributed to the programmatic 
decisions that ultimately led to the resultant costs of these two major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs). A review of the narratives of the Virginia-class and San Antonio-
class programs in conjunction with a basic understanding of the U.S. DOD acquisition 
system facilitates the investigation of interactions between programmatic enablers and 
decisions, and their resultant costs. 
A. U.S. DEFENSE ACQUISITION FAMILIARIZATION 
This section familiarizes the reader with a basic knowledge of DOD acquisition, 
with the many stakeholders, processes, and concepts that affect the MDAPs examined in 
this study. These descriptions are neither exhaustive nor absolute in their depiction of the 
DOD acquisition environment. They provide an introductory vocabulary and framework, 
which enables the reader to more thoroughly perceive the functional and conceptual 
relationships within the U.S. defense acquisition domain. 
1. Purpose 
U.S. defense acquisition provides the equipment and services necessary to 
establish and sustain DOD missions (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  
4 
2. Origins: A Gradual Evolutionary History 
Neither academia nor organizational leaders within the DOD have pinpointed a 
formal or specific date of inception for U.S. defense acquisition. Although the United 
States has requisitioned various goods and services since the formation of the First 
Continental Congress (Schwartz, 2010a), the modern and complex system through which 
the DOD acquires its various weapons systems arose from a number of influential events 
spanning more than a century.  
The most noteworthy turning point for U.S. defense acquisition occurred during 
World War II, when more than one third of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) was 
dedicated to the war (Levit, 2010; Office of Management and Budget, 2011). To 
empower American soldiers and sailors to compete on the battlefield, a new degree of 
weapons systems and acquisition complexity was required. This was especially true in 
the growing fields of aviation, submarine, and nuclear warfare. During this period in 
America, the military was required to significantly increase the level of sophistication of 
its planning, design, purchase, and control of defense acquisitions. WWII demonstrated 
to all major U.S. stakeholders that advantages on the battlefield depended on more 
advanced weapons and more advanced acquisition systems (Hooke, 2005). 
In the years between WWII and the Korean War, leaders within U.S. business and 
industry, as well as leaders within the U.S. government (USG), recognized the need for a 
significant transformation in how the United States developed and acquired new weapons 
systems (Brown, 2005). Those organizations whose production drove the American war 
effort during WWII positioned themselves, over the following decades, to ensure that 
both they and the U.S. warfighter would retain the advantages they established during 
WWII (Converse, 2005). 
The first and most significant of these changes were the Armed Services 
Procurement Regulations, called the ASPR, and the National Defense Act (NDA), which 
consolidated diverse service-specific rules and regulations that had governed military 
procurement since the Civil War (Converse, 2005). One year later, in 1948, the Defense 
Production Act (DPA) was created, which continues to define key aspects of the Defense 
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Industrial Base (DIB). As these laws were codified within Title 10 and Title 50 of the 
United States Code (U.S.C.), the regulations governing U.S. defense acquisition continue 
to expand. In 1978, after decades of growth and adaptation, the ASPA evolved into the 
Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR), and less than a decade later it was transformed 
again.  
Almost 40 years after WWII, in 1984, Congress formalized and published the 
version of acquisition regulation currently in use, the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR). These rules for managing the purchase of DOD weapons systems comprise Title 
48 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) of Federal Regulations. They are an extension of 
Title 41, which outlines the laws governing contracts between the USG and the public. It 
is ultimately these statutory laws that govern the scope and nature of the ever-evolving 
DOD acquisition environment. 
Even in recent years, this evolutionary legislation continues to alter the DOD 
acquisition process in significant ways. From the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990 to the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act 
(WSARA) of 2009, these incremental changes continue to transform, and often 
complicate, weapon systems acquisitions.  
Modern U.S. defense acquisition differs significantly from prior decades. The 
U.S. defense acquisition system slowly evolves via a process of punctuated equilibrium 
states, undergoing continuous cycles of innovation and reform, much of it driven from 
within the DOD, but sometimes helped along by Congress, as evidenced in the preceding 
paragraphs.  
3. Functional Roles 
In general, the traditional functions of a commercial business can also be found 
within DOD acquisition organizations. Unlike traditional separations of an organization 
into departments, which support specific business functions or divisions, the DOD 
acquisition environment relies on organizational structures and authority chains often 
separated by both division and function. Additionally, because authority and 
responsibility are divided among the various organizations in a manner that separates 
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power and compels the sharing of information and oversight, a significant degree of 
complexity and bureaucracy can impact DOD acquisition. 
A simple example of organizational complexity in DOD acquisition can be seen 
in the way manpower is sourced. The billet, called a manpower requirement, of the 
program manager (PM) for an MDAP can derive from an organization separate from and 
unrelated to the organization overseeing the MDAP. The PM is paid for and 
professionally evaluated by one organization and administratively used by another. In 
cases of potential conflict, leaders depend on formal policy to provide resolutions. Thus, 
the many DOD acquisition policies, as well as the various influencers (e.g., process and 
technical information experts) and decision-makers, can significantly affect activities.  
4. “Big A” Acquisition 
The various organizations and the integrated workforce of the DOD acquisition 
environment, though structurally separated, are interconnected through flexible 
relationships in order to operate as a single entity. The many experts each serve in 
numerous capacities and subtly complex roles across this macro-domain, often called the 
“Big A” acquisition process. Within this system-of-systems (SOS) level of interactions 
(Schwartz, 2010a), these experts must continually navigate potentially conflicting 
interests with regard to the formal and informal authority and reporting hierarchies (refer 











Figure 1.  DOD Acquisition Environment Functional Areas 
Personnel within the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) generally provide the 
project management services for each acquisition program. Their efforts include 
planning, research, design, development, inter-organizational synchronization, budget 
control, historical and forecast reporting, innovation, and production. The DAS operates 
continuously, while in a segmented manner, with personnel serving multiple needs as 
required. It is a very fluid environment, under a vigorous bureaucracy. Acquisition 
programs, managed from within the DAS, are event-driven but depend on funding, which 
is calendar-driven (Jones & McCaffery, 2005). 
The outputs of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) process provide information and advice to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), as well as facilitate 
the evolution of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 
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personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P; CJCS, 2012). In a significant sense, this 
process bridges the gap between the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 
procedural and physical advancement of warfighter capabilities, which are necessary to 
accomplish the objectives of the NSS. The JCIDS process operates on an as-needed or 
where-needed basis, identifying, validating, and prioritizing required capabilities. Once 
approval is given for the development of a program, the capability requirements are 
rarely revisited during the development cycle unless there is a significant program breach 
(that is, a major increase in cost or schedule) or a major revision to warfighting strategy.  
The planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process acts as a 
means of managing programs and budgets in a continuous manner across the current year 
and future years, and as designated within the various and separate funding lines. These 
funding lines are often called colors-of-money and have specific legally defined 
boundaries. The year-by-year legalities of DOD acquisition funding and the dual scrutiny 
this process receives from the executive and legislative branches of the USG constrain 
and complicate it, especially when compared with analogous processes within the 
commercial sector. The calendar drives the PPBE process and sets the pace for the 
reporting process and the numerous information exchanges (Jones & McCaffery, 2005). 
5. Managerial Stakeholders 
When seeking to comprehend a large and/or complex system, it can help to 
recognize its key influencers. Since 2003, four groups of experts directly influence the 
ongoing management and development of DOD acquisitions (see Figure 2). These 
experts derive from three primary sources: the JROC, the DOD acquisition workforce (to 
include senior Office of Secretary of Defense [OSD] and military service branch 
leadership and subject matter experts), and U.S. business and industry. Although the 
White House, Congress, and other agencies have significant influence, they rarely 
become involved in the day-to-day management and development of weapons systems. 
Even the JROC depends primarily on the pre-acquisition phase and milestone decision 
meetings in order to exert its full authority. 
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Figure 2.  Acquisition Program Basic Stakeholders 
The JROC is composed of the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
and the vice chiefs of staff from the military branches, and is supported by the JCS staff. 
These senior leaders consider current military assets and operations and compare those 
capabilities and missions to the ever-changing required capabilities, which collectively 
define the NSS. The JROC and its supporting staff organizations collectively facilitate 
and approve those capabilities that will empower U.S. warfighters to accomplish the NSS 
(CJCS, 2012). 
The JROC not only grants the authorization to develop materiel solutions 
(concepts), which leads to the creation of an acquisition program, but they establish the 
metrics of performance for weapon systems and their approval of the initial capabilities 
documents (ICDs). Jointly, these JROC approvals and disapprovals of the various ICDs 
they receive from sponsors (a specific operational command-group within a military 
branch; see Figure 3) determine how all DOD capabilities are spread and integrated 
across a broad range of weapons systems. After the approval of the ICD, the JROC 
depends on the service’s sponsor (or user representative) and the PM to ensure the 
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programs are developed and executed appropriately. The ongoing oversight provided by 
the sponsor and milestone decision authority (MDA) and the Stakeholder Requirements 
Definition documents generally serve the JROC’s interests where capabilities are 
concerned, bridging the gap between the DAS and JCIDS environments (DOD, 2013). 
Each program office contains civilian and military acquisition professionals 
drawn together for the MDAP from a broad resource pool. The team is selected based on 
factors such as experience, education and training, and availability. Each individual 
chosen for a designated role within the program office team is typically matched to his or 
her specialty area (e.g., engineering, financial management, logistics). In a loose way, 
these processes are analogous to the commercial sector’s processes for project 
management as described in the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) 
(DAU Press, 2008; PMI, 2000). 
Program managers in the Navy generally report to the assistant secretary of their 
branch of service through a program executive office (PEO) whose personnel oversee 
multiple weapons systems of similar category (see Figure 3). Large, expensive programs 
are often overseen by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology (USD[AT&L]), who in this role is called the defense acquisition executive 
(DAE). The program manager is the most vital position for synchronizing information 
and decision-making for its designated weapons system.  
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Figure 3.  Program Office Command Hierarchy 
Contractors, both in the early competitive process and after they are selected, have 
a significant direct and indirect influence on the DOD acquisition environment and on the 
specific weapons systems they develop, produce, and sustain. Once the contractor has 
been selected, the USG and the contractor become highly dependent on each other. The 
cost of midstream change is substantial. 
The formal and informal relationships and interactions can be both complex and 
nuanced. For example, although only the warranted procuring contracting officer (PCO) 
is legally capable of authorizing outlays to the contractor, the other leaders and experts 
within the program office can positively and negatively affect the contractor in areas as 
simple as determinations of compliance. Furthermore, the specialized, long-term, and 
often highly competitive nature of DOD acquisition ensures higher degrees of 
collaboration than would be strictly anticipated based on the legal definitions of USG and 
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contractor relationships. The degree of and timing of contractor integration into the DOD 
acquisition value chain affects effectiveness and efficiency of planning and design for 
every MDAP. In this respect, the contractor must work closely with the USG program 
management offices.  
Congress alone holds the power of the purse. The Senate Armed Services 
Committee and the House Armed Services Committee authorize funds, set limits, and 
provide legislative oversight for DOD acquisition programs. The Senate and House 
Appropriations Committees provide additional oversight and specifically appropriate 
funds for DOD acquisition programs (DAU Press, 2008). The yearly budget authority 
(BA) authorized by Congress ensures that DOD weapons systems can be acquired and 
sustained. Updated changes to cost across the various colors-of-money appear in the 
program objective memorandum (POM), for which the program office submits input to 
their service headquarters for established funding periods.  
Although congressional programming and budgeting affects every aspect of 
defense acquisitions, this study focuses on program management–level decisions and 
policies. Much of the budgetary system is addressed only briefly. Only the most critical 
interactions between Congress and these programs are addressed. 
6. The Program Life Cycle 
During the past three decades, a number of segmentations and terms for each 
phase of an MDAP life cycle have been used in the DOD acquisition environment. Figure 
4, found at the end of this section, provides the detailed life cycle typically used by DOD 
acquisition professionals. For simplicity, when depicting the critical events of the DOD 
acquisition life cycle, this study generalizes the elements provided in the textbook by 
Rene G. Rendon and Keith F. Snider’s Management of Defense Acquisition Projects 
(2008; see Figure 5).  
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Figure 4.  Formal Program Life Cycle (from DOD, 2013) 
 
Figure 5.  Elementary Conceptual Program Life Cycle 
a. Pre-Acquisition Phases 
The JROC notes strategic requirements as extracted from the National Military 
Strategy documents and oversees the task by which they are transformed into specific 
mission capabilities. The emerging mission portfolios (capabilities), such as the 
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development of a naval vessel, which can operate in the littoral space and major river-
ways, are then developed into exact capability metrics (e.g., operate in shallow 10-fathom 
waters, operate safely in sea states of 20-foot swells, and operate 60 days without 
resupply). This capabilities list then becomes a declared need.  
This need goes through an analysis of alternatives (AOA) process, which 
examines the value of each concept, similar in the commercial sector to selecting which 
commercial projects should be initiated based on calculations of net present value (NPV). 
Sometimes the need can be met by procedural or policy changes, but other times the need 
should be met by a materiel concept. When the JROC validates the need, it starts the 
process that leads to the establishment of a DOD acquisition program.  
The formal approval of the materiel concept begins with the Materiel 
Development Decision initiating the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) Phase. During 
MSA, an AOA is conducted, resulting in approval of a materiel solution at Milestone A. 
At this point, the life cycle crosses into the technology development (TD) phase, which is 
composed of the early developmental work to mature technologies needed for the 
weapons system and to agree on the preliminary design of the weapon system. As a 
program moves through its life cycle, these early stages tend to impact it in increasingly 
substantial and often unanticipated ways. Planning and design, even in the earliest 
segments of the pre-acquisition period, are the foundation on which every DOD 
acquisition program is established. Any weaknesses in planning or design are likely to 
result in higher costs over the life cycle of the weapon system. 
The initial TD phase is often synonymous with the research, development, test, 
and evaluation (RDT&E) phase. Regardless of the terminology, this period in an 
emerging program’s life cycle is centered on designs, prototypes, and testing. This phase 
solidifies concepts into physical systems (i.e. prototypes) that perform to exact capability 
metrics, called key performance parameters (KPPs; “Key Performance,” 2013) and key 
system attributes (KSAs; “Key System,” 2013). 
All throughout the TD phase, competing contractors demonstrate what their 
materiel solution does; specifically, they prove whether their proposed weapons system 
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will likely meet the target KPPs and KSAs in a more efficient and/or effective manner.  
When the best prototype design and corresponding contractor are determined, the 
milestone decision authority (MDA) decides whether the emerging development will 
move forward.  Milestone B is generally the latest point at which a materiel solution is 
declared a program of record (see Figures 4 and 5).  In the development of a ship, the 
decision as to whether a program enters the acquisition phase earlier than Milestone B 
depends on numerous design and planning factors.  The document that formalizes this 
decision is the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM).  The TD phase can take 
several years depending on the weapon systems and incorporated technologies.  
b. Acquisition Phases 
The engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase begins when a 
weapons system passes Milestone B (“Milestone B,” 2012). After the JROC agents and 
MDA have approved the weapons system as a program of record, the program office and 
the selected contractor begin to engineer the systems and processes required to build and 
maintain the weapons system. The physical prototype and its engineering, manufacturing, 
maintenance, and logistics systems all undergo significant developmental processes in 
order to ensure that both production and sustainment can be dependably accomplished 
within projected timelines and costs levels.  
The EMD phase completes at Milestone C as the production and deployment (PD) 
phase begins (“Milestone C,” 2012).  The PD phase has a dual focus of thoroughly 
improving weapons system production and implementing support (logistics) systems for 
the sustainment period, also called the operations and support (O&S) period.   
For ships and submarines, these three phases of the acquisition period overlap and 
blend significantly due to the long-term nature of ship construction schedules.  This 
blending is further complicated by the fact that the lead ship and lead submarine are 
considered “Block 1” vessels, which will be deployed operationally without the 
prototyping process typical of many other weapon systems.  Only after a final evaluation, 
called the initial operational capability (IOC) review, will the first Block 1 ship or 
submarine be commissioned and then operationally deployed.   
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Once these initial vessels are deployed into the operational environment, new 
blocks with incrementally improved designs, systems, and processes will cycle through 
the program life cycle.  Although this spiraling or cyclic loop for incremental 
development improves both the usefulness and the efficiency of the weapons system, it 
also adds to the complexity of sustainment.  In significant respects, especially with ships 
and submarines, each major weapons system is unique.  
c. Sustainment Period 
Although planning and decisions that affect the sustainment stage can occur as 
early as the materiel systems analysis phase and TD phase, sustainment does not begin 
until the first weapons system is delivered to an operational command. In a significant 
sense, the first commissioning ceremony formally initiates the sustainment stage of a ship 
or submarine. 
As authority over each weapons system is transferred from the program office to 
the appropriate operational command hierarchy, a number of significant changes occur. 
For instance, the pre-staged logistics (e.g., pre-purchased initial spares, component 
consumables, initial shelf stock, etc.) and maintenance and logistics information channels 
are activated. Also, critical contractor technical representatives (tech reps) are stationed 
to provide supplemental training and troubleshooting. During each vessel’s first year in 
operation, the operational commands depend heavily on the program management team 
and the contractor tech reps to ensure that operational performance reflects the 
benchmarks established within the acquisition period.  
The complexity of such beginnings, as well as the least-developed nature of the 
Block 1 (i.e., first in its class) ships and submarines, may cause these vessels to 
experience higher than average O&S costs, when compared to other vessels in the class. 
The reassignment of the weapons system from what is a laboratory developmental/test 
environment into its intended operational environment can disrupt both the performance 
and the cost assumptions. The necessity of making complex and expensive weapons 
systems work ensures that some portion of uncertainty is mitigated by ingenuity. 
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Ultimately, the inherent correlation between theoretical and practical application attained 
during this period sets the stage for this platform’s (weapons system) future.  
Although the operational information channels filter data back to the program 
office, as of 1984 there are central and permanent repositories for costs and usage 
incurred during the O&S (sustainment) period. For the U.S. Navy, the primary data 
repository is the Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) 
database. Even though this wealth of information is both centralized and accessible, the 
availability of this data does not automatically lead to conclusive analysis or immediate 
program updates.  
Most ship and submarine platforms are expected to serve in the fleet for only 
about 30 years. This means that more than one third of the Block 1 vessel’s life will be 
complete before 10 annual data points have been recorded for a trend analysis. 
Furthermore, during these 10 years, as many as 20 additional vessels may have been 
commissioned. Each of these vessels, though grouped, do not necessarily fit the initial 
vessel’s averages, due in part to operations schedules and major repair schedules, which 
span across multiyear periods and are difficult to directly compare. If each vessel is 
unique prior to commissioning, this condition increases as each vessel progresses through 
its life cycle. 
Decisions as well as results within the sustainment period depend on highly 
variable conditions. No absolute synchronicity is imposed between the assumptions of the 
acquisition period and the O&S phase. Just as the forecasting of costs for significantly 
different operating conditions around the world (in an ever-changing world) is perhaps 
one of the most uncertain aspects of the life-cycle cost estimates, ensuring that actual 
costs and operational tempos resemble original assumptions is the most uncertain aspect 
of sustainment costs. Operators must respond to a highly variable operational 
environment. 
d. Disposal  
Although this stage of a vessel’s life cycle is affected by a number of interesting 
factors, many of which relate to cost and performance (e.g., resale, spare parts 
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cannibalization, and social and contingency considerations), this study does not focus 
significantly on this period. Although costly, especially when nuclear systems are 
involved, the disposal period is the least costly of the life-cycle phases. Typically, ship 
disposal occurs incrementally as individual weapons systems are decommissioned. As the 
disposal stage begins, overlapping with the sustainment stage, average sustainment costs 
are reduced due to reduced usage.  
7. Triple Constraint 
DOD acquisition programs are constrained by the same three tradeoff metrics as 
commercial sector projects: cost, schedule and performance (Rendon & Snider, 2008). In 
the USG acquisition environment, this is simply referred to as the triple constraint, and 
PMs are required to adhere to their budget, time, and specification thresholds.  
DOD acquisition PMs must understand where the flexibility exists within these 
three constraints, and who owns which primary and secondary factors. Understanding 
who has the authority to readjust component KPPs and KSAs gives the PM an 
understanding of the limits of possible reapportionment within the triple constraint trade 
space. 
Dennis K. Van Gemert and Martin Wartenberg (2007), in an article of the 
Defense Acquisition Review Journal, “Lessons Learned in Acquisition,” discussed the 
triple constraint trade space as follows: 
During initial scope planning, prioritize the triple constraint variables. For 
example, quality tends to be an inflexible variable, whereas availability, 
maintainability, and reliability are components of quality. Determining 
relative sensitivities among triple constraint variables will facilitate system 
requirements trades performed during critical points in the program. (p. 
387) 
Similarly, in the 2013 Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG), the writers 
elaborate on the triple constraint trade space as follows: 
Cost, schedule, and performance may be traded within the “trade space” 
between the objective and the threshold without obtaining Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA) approval. Making trade-offs outside the trade 
space (i.e., decisions that result in acquisition program parameter changes) 
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require approval of both the MDA and the capability needs approval 
authority. Validated Key Performance Parameters may not be traded-off 
without approval by the validation authority. The PM and the user should 
work together on all trade-off decisions. (DOD, 2013, p. 805) 
These quotes demonstrate the unique language through which DOD acquisition 
professionals communicate. More simply restated, many metrics that are otherwise 
untouchable can be affected and managed by their component variables. The power to 
adjust these smaller pieces of the triple constraint trade space gives PMs a means of 
locally managing uncertainty and any emerging conditions that could negatively affect 
the cost, schedule, or performance of their MDAP. See Figure 6 for a conceptual 
depiction of the Triple Constraint. 
 
Figure 6.  Triple Constraint Trade Space Diagram 
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PMs excel by expertly mitigating the risks of such uncertainty and by adapting the 
trade space within the triple constraint to responsively pursue their initial targets. In 
essence, all of the various decisions that alter or adapt an MDAP can be simplified to 
simply reflect their effect on these three factors. All changes to a program affect either 
one or more of these three primary factors: performance, cost, and schedule.  
8. Basic Acquisition Cost Terminology 
When analyzing the management of a DOD acquisition program, readers must 
understand some key terms and practices as to how the DOD sums and groups costs. The 
outcome of grouping costs is dependent on conditions such as different organizations 
with differing missions, differing points in the MDAP’s life cycle, and differing practices 
regarding the inclusion or exclusion of manpower costs. These differences can make a 
detailed analysis difficult. For example, a keen understanding of the interactions between 
elemental properties of some costs (e.g., variable, incremental fixed, fixed) is muddied 
when mixing dissimilar cost types. The following cost terms provide an introductory 
acquaintance with cost groupings utilized within the DOD acquisition environment (see 
Figure 7). 
Before addressing the different ways of summarizing acquisition program costs, it 
is important to understand that acquisition costs are expressed in base-year (BY) dollars, 
often called then-year (TY) dollars (e.g., nominal dollars), and in current-year (CY) 
dollars (e.g., constant dollars). The BY dollars represent the purchase power of a dollar as 
normalized to the acquisition program’s first year. The difference between these dollar 
types is inflation. The DOD acquisition environment has established an approved joint 
inflation calculator (JIC) by which the TY dollars and CY dollars are normalized for 
proper comparison. When reading and expressing dollars within the DOD acquisition 




Figure 7.  Cost Categories in Acquisition 
a. Average Procurement Unit Cost 
The average procurement unit cost (APUC) factors in all the procurement costs, 
excluding the RDT&E and MILCON costs, as shown in Figure 7. Reports show the 
APUC as a smaller cost than the program acquisition unit cost (PAUC). The APUC 
includes the weapons system, the support equipment and tools, the hardware and 
software, the training and technical document and electronic files, and the initial spare 
parts required to stand-up the operational command and support for about a year when it 
deploys (see Figure 7).  
Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) = Total Procurement Dollars (in program BY$) 
/ Total procurement quantity.  (1) 
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b. Program Acquisition Unit Cost 
The PAUC factors in all the acquisition costs including all of the RDT&E, 
Procurement and MILCON costs. Reports show PAUC as a larger cost than APUC. 
Conceptually, the PAUC reflects every cost required to produce the weapons system, 
including the technology and capital expenditure costs necessary to bring the program 
into an operational status (e.g., producible, reproducible, reliable, etc.).  
Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) = Total Acquisition Dollars (in program BY$) / 
Total procurement quantity.  (2) 
c. Total Ownership Cost 
The total ownership cost (TOC) factors in all the acquisition costs (research, 
design, development, and production) and all the sustainment costs (O&S). The TOC 
includes the cost of personnel required to operate the weapons system, as well as 
infrastructure and administration costs (cost of doing business), which can be attributed 
to the weapons system. Although the TOC and the life-cycle cost are often used 
interchangeably in the DOD acquisition environment, the TOC does not typically include 
the disposal costs. Life-cycle cost typically does not include the service-level overhead 
slice (such as recruiting, retaining, and otherwise supporting military and civilian 
personnel) that is chargeable to the weapon system. Affordability, as discussed in this 
study, refers to reductions in TOC (DOD, 1992). 
d. Sailaway Costs 
The sailaway cost refers to the individual contract cost to produce one specific 
weapon system (i.e., ship or submarine). These costs reflect the efficiency of production, 
especially schedule conditions like labor. These costs, more than any other, should 
demonstrate gains from the benefits of the learning. As the competing contractors 
produce each additional hull, the costs should decrease geometrically (i.e., learning 
curve). Although the degree of learning expressed in the curve can be debated, without a 
logical and consistent decrease in these costs, the contractor cannot credibly assert they 
have performed well.  
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9. Earned Value Management  
The earned value management system (EVMS) process offers a common means 
of tracking and evaluating progress and change of cost, schedule, and work performance 
within an MDAP, expressed in terms of dollars (DOD, 1992). PMs and other 
stakeholders monitor and discuss the status of cost and schedule via the language of the 
EVMS process (Defense Contract Management Agency, 2006). This section familiarizes 
the reader with the most succinct ratio for appraising how well the MDAP has executed 
costs and schedules relative to the approved targets: cost and schedule efficiency indexes. 
Although cost and schedule variances also reflect whether an MDAP has outperformed or 
underperformed relative to the target budget and schedule (as established from the 
acquisition program baseline [APB]), the cost and schedule efficiency ratios simplify 
appraisals. Cost and schedule efficiency can simply be stated as favorable or unfavorable 
(see Figure 8). 
Notably, the EMVS also tracks performances in an indirect sense, through the 
credible assumption that signatories cannot or will not sign off any portion of the 
scheduled work effort unless it is substantially complete and is therefore in compliance 
with quality tolerances. The EVMS process does not provide an absolute depiction of the 
degrees of quality and the quantity of incorporated rework due to its indirect manner of 
addressing performance. The amount to which the EMVS process depicts performance 




Figure 8.  EVMS Measuring Performance, Gold Card (from DOD, 2013) 
a. Cost Efficiency  
DOD acquisition professionals calculate cost efficiency from the Cost 
Performance Index (CPI) ratio of budgeted cost for work performed (BCWP) to date and 
actual cost of work performed (ACWP) to date. That is, 
  
 CPI = Budgeted Cost for Work Performed / Actual Cost of Work Performed. (3) 
 
This ratio can provide a comparison between the costs a contractor has reported as 
incurred in order to construct a submarine (or ship) to a specific percentage complete 
versus the costs from the original plan to be complete to that percentage. A CPI score 
above 1.00 reflects a favorable position for the program. A CPI score below 1.00 reflects 
an unfavorable position for the program. A CPI score of 1.00 shows the program to be on 
target, often stated as “on course” or “on glide-slope.” Notably, the CPI score does not 
necessarily indicate the source or causes of the underperformance, only the status of the 
program relative to its original plan. 
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b. Schedule Efficiency  
DOD acquisition professionals calculate schedule efficiency from the Schedule 
Performance Index (SPI) ratio of BCWP to date and budgeted cost for work scheduled 
(BCWS) for the current date. That is,  
SPI = Budgeted Cost for Work Performed / Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled. 
       (4) 
This ratio can provide a comparison between the costs a contractor has reported as 
incurred in order to construct a submarine (or ship) to a specific percentage complete 
versus the costs from the original plan to be complete as of the current date. As with the 
CPI, an SPI score below 1.00 reflects an unfavorable position for the program, whereas a 
score above 1.00 reflects favorable. An SPI score of 1.00 shows the program to be on 
target. Again, the SPI score does not necessarily indicate the source or causes of the 
underperformance, only the status of the program relative to its original plan.  
10. Basics of Acquisition Reporting  
Various critical reviews for MDAPs, as noted on the life-cycle chart (see Figure 
5), to include milestone decision meetings, require the preparation and dissemination of 
specific reports. These reports depict the ongoing changes to the triple constraint trade 
space. A high degree of familiarity with the DOD acquisition environment and program 
development leads to a nuanced understanding of this trade space and the depictions in 
these reports. As with the commercial sector, some important answers reside between the 
lines.  
This section provides the reader with the most basic familiarity with the types of 
reports and their intended purposes. The story for each MDAP emerges from these 
reports. Finding this story requires the utilization of the previously mentioned 
terminology and a general understanding of the fundamental relationships and practices 
of project management, accounting, and business management. The story is always there, 
buried beneath the words.  However, in some cases reports and information remain 
unavailable and therefore cannot be analyzed. 
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The DAG (DOD, 2013) discusses some of the following reporting documents:  
 analysis of alternatives (AOAs); 
 life-cycle cost estimates; 
 independent cost estimates (ICEs); 
 acquisition program baseline (APB) reports;  
 current estimates (CEs); 
 selected acquisition reports (SARs); 
 defense acquisition executive summary (DAES) reports;  
 significant cost growth notices; 
 unit cost reports (UCRs); 
 critical cost breach notices; 
 initial operational capability objective breach notices.  
Although all of these reporting documents provide important information, this 
study draws primarily from SARs, DAES reports, and information regarding critical cost 
breach notices. These reports corroborated data and assisted in the substantiation of 
findings from key qualitative references (e.g., RAND, the Congressional Research 
Service [CRS], and the Government Accountability Office [GAO]). 
Notably, the reporting for the sustainment period, often called the O&S period, 
flows through less readily accessible channels. Solutions for many issues in an 
operational environment come from a diverse and dispersed group of experts. Although 
the cost databases and the maintenance databases collect a wealth of information, this 
data does not necessarily depict or flag every event in a manner that will explain a 
resolution and permit the extraction of best practices. Eventually, numerous sustainment 
period reports for cost and maintenance provide information bundled into central 
repositories, such as Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR), 
Visibility and Management of Operations and Support Costs (VAMOSC), and Decision 
Knowledge Programming for Logistics Analysis and Technical Evaluation 
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(DECKPLATE). Access to such repositories is closely managed by the DOD through 
their applicable web entry-points and access to this data is restricted. 
a. Selected Acquisition Report 
The SAR provides reviewers with a synopsis of past, present, and likely future 
cost and schedule execution. Additionally, it offers generalized explanations as to why 
progress differs from targets. An example SAR coversheet is provided in Figure 9. Each 
SAR includes the PAUC and APUC, which can be compared against targets and previous 
costs. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in its 1996 executive summary on 
acquisition program reporting (DODD 5000.1, 5000.2-R) summarized the SAR as 
follows: 
The SAR provides the status of total program cost, schedule, and 
performance, as well as program unit cost and unit cost breach 
information; and, in the case of joint programs, the SAR shall include such 
information for all joint participants. Each SAR shall also include a full 
life-cycle cost analysis for the reporting program and its antecedent 
program. 
The SAR for the quarter ending December 31 is called the annual SAR. 
Each annual (December) SAR, shall be submitted 60 days after the date on 
which the President transmits the budget to Congress for the following 
fiscal year. Annual SARs are mandatory for all programs that meet the 
reporting criteria. (section 6.2.4.1, p. 3) 
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Figure 9.  Selected Acquisition Report Cover Page Example  
(from DAMIR, 2012b) 
b. Defense Acquisition Executive Summary 
The DAES reports potential and actual program risks, primarily in text-based 
descriptions summarizing events and conditions. DAES reports are typically submitted 
quarterly with changes in cost reported and forecasts made based on a month-to-month 
basis. The OSD (1996) summarized the DAES report as follows: 
At a minimum, the DAES is the vehicle for reporting program 
assessments, unit cost (10 USC § 24331), current estimates of the APB 
parameters (10 USC § 24352), status reporting of exit criteria, and 
vulnerability assessments (e.g. APB deviation) (FMFIA3). (part 6, p. 2) 
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The DAES reports include different types of information and degrees of detail 
depending on where the program is in its life cycle and the cost, schedule, and 
performance statuses. As noted in the DAG (DOD, 2013), at any given time, the 
assessment categories shown in Figure 10 could be addressed by a key stakeholder. 
 
Figure 10.  Assessment Categories Defense Acquisition Executive Summary  
(from DOD, 2013) 
c. Critical Cost Breach Notice 
Notices of critical cost breaches are typically called notifications of a Nunn–
McCurdy breach. Such a notice refers to costs increasing or decreasing beyond thresholds 
established in the Nunn–McCurdy Act of 1982. To understand the manner in which and 
the specificity with which DOD acquisition professionals explain these notices, consider 
the following excerpt from the DAG: 
Per section 2433a of title 10 United States Code, the Program Manager 
shall notify the Department of Defense Component Acquisition Executive 
(CAE) immediately, whenever there is a reasonable cause to believe that 
the current estimate of either the Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) 
or Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) objective of a Major Defense 
Acquisition Program (MDAP), or designated subprogram (in base-year 
dollars) has increased by at least 25 percent over the PAUC or APUC 
objective of the currently approved Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) 
estimate, or at least 50 percent over the PAUC or APUC objective of the 















Without a prior knowledge of BY dollars, the PAUC, the APUC, and the APB, 
someone unacquainted with the DOD acquisition environment and its terms would be 
hard-pressed to discern this excerpt. In simple terms, the PM must inform key 
stakeholders (like the CAE, as noted above) of a critical cost breach when the program 
costs of either type (APUC or PAUC) exceed 25% of the most current approved budget. 
Additionally, if the MDAP exceeds 50% of the original baseline budget, for either cost 
type, the MDAP has breached Nunn–McCurdy cost thresholds and must notify the CAE 
of this breach. Since 2009, a 50% cost breach will prevent the MDAP from receiving any 
additional funding (essentially killing the program) if the secretary of defense does not 
specially certify the program for continuation. More details on this and other forms of 
cost control legislation follow in the next section. 
11. Affordability in Legislation  
Whether due to Cold War exigencies or capabilities-centric management, for 
decades the DOD acquisition environment focused so fiercely on the performance of a 
weapon system that cost considerations were often marginalized. Legislation has 
continued to grow in an effort to institutionalize and reinforce cost-wise practices and 
requirements. Two of the most noteworthy and well recognized of such congressional 
acts are the DOD Authorization Act of 1983 (Public Law 97–252), which included the 
Nunn–McCurdy Act (10 U.S.C. 2433), and the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act 
(WSARA) of 2009 (Public Law 111–23). In conjunction with other legislative mandates 
and institutionalized policies aimed at controlling costs, these acts legally require 
activities that compel DOD acquisition professionals (such as PMs) to regularly consider 
costs when appraising their programs and when making cost critical decisions. The 
Nunn–McCurdy Act evolved and the WSARA was established while the submarines and 
ship MDAPs of this study were in development or production. Although the precise 
effects on these MDAPs would be difficult to ascertain, the influence of these acts was 
present as noted by comments in numerous studies. 
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a. Nunn–McCurdy Act 
The Nunn–McCurdy Act focuses on the costs of acquisition. Although the Nunn–
McCurdy Act continues to be amended (updated), its purpose has generally remained the 
same. It mandates the consideration and communication of specific negative cost events. 
Most notably, it requires that the PM notify key stakeholders of a critical cost breach, in 
particular the CAE, when either APUC or PAUC increase beyond 25% of the current 
baseline budget or 50% of the original baseline (target) budget. In the most general sense, 
the Nunn–McCurdy Act simply enforces cost tracking and reporting. The introduction of 
the WSARA in 2009 further expanded the influence of the Nunn–McCurdy Act, giving it 
“real teeth.”  
b. Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act 
Like the Nunn–McCurdy Act, the WSARA primarily addresses the costs of the 
acquisition (RDT&E and procurement). In a significant sense, the WSARA was created 
to both increase the impact of the Nunn–McCurdy Act requirements and expand on its 
aim of improved cost control and general affordability in DOD acquisition. The specific 
languages of the WSARA forces cost consideration across all of the DOD acquisition 
functional areas (DAS, JCIDS, and PPBE). Additionally, it indirectly informed the 
contractors of the legislative seriousness of the breaching cost thresholds. These are 
examples of WSARA mandates that significantly altered the manner in which the DOD 
acquisition environment addresses costs: 
 The Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) was 
created to analyze and address the costs of new programs. This mandate 
creates a central authority that enforces better cost management 
(affordability). 
 The director of the CAPE (DCAPE) must ensure that each alternative 
materiel solution presented to the JROC fully considers possible trade-offs 
among cost, schedule, and performance objectives (Husband & Kaspersen, 
2012). This mandate forces the sponsor (military service seeking the 
weapon system) to more fully address affordability from the outset. 
 The DCAPE must assess whether or not “the joint military requirement 
can be met in a manner that is consistent with the cost and schedule 
objectives recommended by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council” 
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(U.S. Congress [1997], part 1, ch. 7, p. 1) This mandate requires the 
DCAPE to ensure the JROC is considering affordability when approving 
ICDs (10 U.S.C. §181 [1977]). 
 The WSARA directs that continued funding (budget authority) must cease 
for any program that has a critical Nunn–McCurdy breach, unless the 
secretary of defense certifies the program shall continue to be funded. 
Both the immediate threat of program cancelation and the additional 
oversight imposed by the WSARA for such breaches make them 
increasingly menacing to both PMs and contractors. 
 The WSARA obligates DOD acquisition professionals, specifically cost 
estimators, to pursue 80% confidence levels when producing cost 
estimates.  
 The WSARA establishes a Configuration Requirements Board, which 
addresses ongoing trade-off decisions within the triple constraint trade 
space. This board gives PMs a place where they can make unilateral 
affordability recommendations, including whether or not they believe the 













III. VIRGINIA-CLASS SUBMARINE STUDY 
This section seeks to inform about the U.S. Navy’s Virginia-class submarine and 
submarines in general, to provide enough understanding of the circumstances 
surrounding the industry to comprehend this case study’s focus of controlling the costs of 
acquisitions. This chapter relies heavily on the previous work of Ronald O’Rourke 
(2013), Congressional Research Service (CRS) specialist in naval affairs in his Navy 
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for 
Congress. Readers seeking the full report are encouraged to source it through the CRS.  
A. INTRODUCTION TO VIRGINIA CLASS 
The Virginia-class submarine is the first American submarine acquisition 
following the end of the Cold War, with initial planning commencing in 1992 and the 
first submarine achieving initial operating capability in September 2008. A goal of 
Virginia-class was to provide a lower cost platform comparison to Seawolf-class in both 
procurement and sustainment with a broad mix of capabilities to enable it to perform a 
variety of missions. Virginia-class is the product of design efforts by Electric Boat with 
input from the material developer, the U.S. Navy. This differs from early nuclear-
powered submarines that were designed solely by the Navy (Schank et al., 2007). 
1. Existing Submarines 
The U.S. Navy operates four nuclear-powered submarine classes, in chronological 
order: Ohio-class, Los Angeles-class, Seawolf-class, and Virginia-class. These four 
classes of submarines perform three missions: 
1. ballistic missile submarines (SSBN); 
2. cruise missile and special operations forces insertion (SSGN); and 
3. attack submarines: submarine nuclear power (SSN; O’Rourke, 2013). 
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a. Ballistic Missile Submarines 
As referenced from the U.S. Navy’s fact file, fleet ballistic missile submarines 
have one mission: to provide the United States with the most enduring nuclear strike 
capability. The U.S. fleet of ballistic missile submarines is composed of 14 Ohio-class 
submarines, each capable of carrying 24 submarine-launched Trident II D5 ballistic 
missiles. The warheads of the Trident II D5 are capable of being independently targeted. 
Ballistic missile submarines are deployed solely for strategic-deterrence missions (Naval 
Sea Systems Command, 2014b). 
b. Cruise Missile and Special Operations Insertion 
Cruise missile employment is an act of launching an offensive land-attack missile 
from submerged depths. U.S. Navy attack submarines and guided-missile surface 
combatants (CG and DDG) employ the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, capable of 
striking targets on land greater than 800 or 1000 miles, depending on the variant used. 
The Tomahawk carries a 1000-pound warhead or several smaller warheads capable of 
being designated to strike different targets (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2014c). 
Special operations forces (SOF) insertion is the capability to employ SOF, 
typically U.S. Navy Seals, from a deployed submarine. The SOF is deployed either from 
one of the missile tubes on an attack submarine, or via a miniature submarine known as a 
swimmer delivery vehicle (SDV) on a converted ballistic missile submarine, recently 
redesigned as an SSGN. Insertion of SOF via submarines decreases the chances of being 
detected on covert missions in comparison to surface ships or airborne delivery, in many 
cases. 
c. Attack Submarines 
The Navy Fact File describes attack submarines as “designed to seek and destroy 
enemy submarines and surface ships; project power ashore with Tomahawk cruise 
missiles and Special Operation forces; carry out Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) missions; support battle group operations; engage in mine warfare” 
(Naval Sea Systems Command, 2014a. The U.S. Navy currently has three different 
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classes of attack submarines in its inventory: the Los Angeles-class, Seawolf-class, and 
Virginia-class.  
The Virginia-class will eventually replace the Los Angeles-class and must 
perform all five of the following strategic mission types: national-level surveillance, SOF 
insertion and recovery (on a smaller scale than SSGNs), Tomahawk Cruise Missile 
strikes (on a smaller scale than SSGNs), covert offensive and defensive mine warfare, 
and anti-surface ship and anti-submarine warfare (O’Rourke, 2013). 
2. Seawolf-Class History 
The Seawolf-class was designed at the height of the Cold War when the United 
States sought a new vessel to provide the unprecedented performance capabilities 
required to counter the Soviet Union. The 1997 Seawolf-class SAR described the 
Seawolf-class as follows: 
The SEA WOLF submarine is a multi-mission vessel that introduces 
unprecedented performance capabilities. It is the quietest, most heavily 
armed attack submarine the Navy has ever built. The design of the SEA 
WOLF is based on an extensive research and development program and 
incorporates technological advancements to provide: order of magnitude 
improvement in ship quieting; improved acoustic sensors; more capable 
combat systems; greater weapon capacity and capability; quieter launch; 
weapon launch at high ship speed; advanced reactor; improved 
performance machinery program; an advanced propulsor; increased 
operating depth; improved ship control; and enhanced survivability. 
(DAMIR, 1997a, p. 4) 
The post–Cold War–U.S. Navy inventory no longer required a significant number 
of Seawolf-class submarines. Originally, the class was to consist of 30 submarines but 
was later reduced to 12; however, construction was stopped after three, due to the high 
cost of acquisition, sustainment, and need to produce more submarines. The submarines 
replaced the aging fleet of attack submarines approaching planned disposal. The APUC 
adjusted for 2010 dollars is $4.255 billion (2010 dollars) for Seawolf-class in comparison 
to $1.926 billion (2010 dollars) for Virginia-class, based on a reduced number of units in 
the Seawolf-class (DAMIR, 1997a, 2012a). 
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3. Alternatives to Virginia Class 
In 1994, the Senate discussed whether to continue building Seawolf-class as 
planned to avoid the high startup costs of any new ship class, or to consider building 
Virginia-class. Continuing Seawolf-class construction, as the Senate committee debated, 
would cost $21.05 billion (2010 dollars) and would yield five submarines over 10 years 
from 1994 to 2004. Virginia-class was selected over Seawolf-class, and the cost incurred 
through 2004 was $24.955 billion (2010 dollars). Two new submarines were completed 
and three were under construction (DAMIR, 1997a, 2012a). 
Continuing the Seawolf-class line would have provided additional quantity, 
lethality, and reduced costs in the near term (through 2004). Because the primary goal of 
Virginia-class was affordability followed by flexibility then lethality, this brings into 
question the strategic validity of choosing Virginia-class in the near term.  
Considering only the difference in acquisition costs, the current APUC of $2.757 
billion (adjusted to 2010 dollars) per submarine represents a savings of $1.35 billion per 
submarine over the Seawolf-class’s $4.212 billion (2010 dollars). The savings per 
submarine and the reduction of APUC over time make Virginia-class a fiscally 
responsible decision when judged solely by affordability in acquisition. The operations 
and maintenance (O&M) aspect of the Virginia-class is evaluated in the following 
sections (DAMIR, 1999a, 2012a). 
4. An Ocean Devoid of the USSR 
At the earliest point in the pre-acquisition phase, acquisition leaders and the 
Congress planned for the Virginia-class to cost less and have greater mission flexibility 
than the Seawolf-class and Los Angeles-class. The demand for Seawolf-class was 
established during the Cold War, when the United States determined strategic capability 
requirements based on a defined, well-known threat—in this case, the Soviet Navy. At 
that time, the emphasis in acquisition was not on affordability, at least not to the degree 
that PMs experience today. Seawolf-class was cancelled after only three submarines were 
constructed. The primary drivers behind this decision were the escalating construction 
costs and evolving requirements (Johnson, Drakeley, & Smith, n.d.). 
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5. Emphasis on the Littorals 
Although the Virginia-class of submarine would need to factor in the continued 
Russian threat, it would also be asked to do much more in terms of the variety of its 
missions. Most notably, it would operate in the areas nearer the shore, known as littoral 
operating areas, or commonly as the littorals. This increase in capability of the Virginia-
class increased the complexity of the design. In contrast to previous classes of U.S. 
submarines, the Virginia-class was required to have the capability to operate in the 
littorals. Although many other nations had been routinely focusing their operations in 
these areas for several years, this capability of the Virginia-class was new to the U.S. 
Navy (Schank et al., 2011). 
B. VIRGINIA-CLASS ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
The following subsections provide background to the acquisition and construction 
of the initial submarines in the Virginia-class. 
1. The 21st-Century Submarine 
It was anticipated that the Virginia-class submarine would be optimized from 
initial build to meet the operational demands of the 21st century while seeking a more 
disciplined acquisition strategy that considered affordability. The procurement team faced 
three distinct challenges that its predecessors did not: 
1. The platform must be able to perform all traditional submarine missions, 
operate in the littorals, plus be able to perform multiple new missions, 
some of which have not yet been developed. 
2. It must be affordable to build. 
3. It must be affordable to sustain. 
The Navy sought to meet the variety of capability requirements while controlling 
the costs. The Virginia-class team sought to retain the quieting and maintain the 
elementary combat system of Seawolf-class, but also sought to shift to open-architecture 
design for the various proven technologies. Open architecture allows components to be 
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removed or replaced based on mission necessity and future technologies not yet required 
or available. Virginia-class looked for reductions, resulting in cost savings in the 
following areas: 
 reduction in maximum flank speed, 
 reduction in weapons payload and weapons delivery rate, 
 reduction in maximum depth, and 
 minimizing crew complement (Schank et al., 2011). 
2. Mission Requirements 
The Virginia-class is designed to accomplish seven core missions: 
 covert strike, 
 anti-submarine warfare, 
 battle group support, 
 covert intelligence, 
 covert mine laying, and 
 special operations (Schank et al., 2011; U.S. Senate, 1992). 
3. Planning 
In planning, the Navy sought to accomplish savings through preventing common 
mistakes from previous acquisition projects. Lessons learned from previous programs 
reflected that high common costs in submarine acquisition were incurred once deviations 
from initial requirements occurred (Schank et al., 2011). 
a. Introduction of Integrated Product Teams 
The most expensive labor cost in ship construction is rework. Virginia-class 
planners sought to mitigate rework to the extent that Electric Boat completely 
restructured its management control system and implemented a divisional structure to 
address the problem of costly rework during ship construction. The divisionization, 
known as major area teams (MATs), functionally operated as integrated product teams 
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(IPTs), consisting of designers, engineers, vendors, environmental and logistics 
technicians, computer-assisted design (CAD) operators, a space manager, and Navy PM 
representative. Newport News Shipyard, following successful implementation by Electric 
Boat, used IPTs, and construction utilized 15 MATs that were supervised by two major 
area integration teams (Schank et al., 2007, 2011). 
The Navy engaged the union leadership from the beginning of the design process 
with Virginia-class. This engagement brought the customer (Navy) together with the 
contractor, Electric Boat (EB), to work toward their individual and common goals. The 
Navy sought to keep costs down, while EB had compensation goals. Together, they 
sought to build Virginia-class and keep EB open. Although the Virginia-class program 
was not free of labor issues, the early engagement with union leadership is viewed as a 
positive contributor to the program (Schank et al., 2011). 
The MATs realized efficiencies in collaboration among the teams on the 
integration of the major areas that divided the ship. An example of this is the 
collaboration between a space manager of an auxiliary machinery room, which shares 
bulkheads with the habitability, command and control systems module, and weapons 
space. Under the MAT structure, the teams could collaborate as necessary to remove any 
uncertainty in how their teams would integrate. Examples include piping, electric, 
ventilation, and hydraulic systems, many of which travel through multiple compartments 
throughout the ship. The ease of communication and interaction facilitated by existing 
relationships and contacts fostered strong working relationships in the program (Schank 
et al., 2011).  
IPTs were used extensively throughout the acquisition phase of Virginia-class: 
design, construction, and delivery. Virginia-class was the first submarine class designed 
using IPTs. Use of the IPT was successful in controlling costs of acquisition by fostering 
communication with stakeholders in the construction process. Positive feedback from the 
program indicated that collaboration was improved by compelling the USG 
representative, either a PM or direct representative, to be involved in the cooperative 
acquisition process with the contractors and suppliers. This organization of the IPTs 
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contributed toward reaching a cooperative goal of cost reduction without quality 
degradation (Schank et al., 2007, 2011). 
b. Two Shipyards  
The first four submarines were built with significant components from two 
shipyards and this process has continued throughout the Virginia-class program. EB was 
the single design agent for the contract and the construction prime contractor; however, 
several components have been subcontracted to Newport News to follow the build 
contracts. Additionally, several submarines have been, and will continue to be 
constructed in Newport News, VA, with components prefabricated at EB in Connecticut 
(Schank et al., 2011). 
c. Multiyear Procurement Contract 
While the projected cost acquisition savings did not materialize in SSN 774 or 
SSN 775, innovations eventually resulted in stopping, and in some cases reversing, the 
cost growth of major components of the program. The initial procurement proposal from 
the Navy requested the procurement of four Virginia-class submarines under a multiyear 
procurement agreement. This proposal was considered a deviation from the norm in the 
acquisition community for a program of this magnitude and complexity that had yet to 
produce even one unit in the class. “In contrast, to the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer 
(DDG 51) program, the last shipbuilding program to enter into a multiyear procurement 
contract was well into its acquisition cycle when multiyear procurement authority was 
approved” (GAO, 2003, p. 2).  
Multi-year procurement became a significant component of the cost savings. 
Multiyear procurement had a positive effect on controlling cost growth in procurement, 
resulting in $200 million in cost savings. When procuring submarine raw materials and 
components, defense contractors were able to reduce costs by purchasing materials in 
bulk for the construction of several different submarines of the class. The savings 
achieved by the multiyear procurement contract is referred to as economic order quantity 
(Goff, McNamara, Bradley, Trost, & Jabaley, 2012; Johnson et al., n.d.). 
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d. Lean Six Sigma 
The Virginia-class team utilized Lean Six Sigma throughout the procurement 
process to control cost growth and build efficiencies through continuous process 
improvement, eliminating waste and duplication efforts (Johnson et al., n.d., p. 5). By 
utilizing Lean Six Sigma the Virginia-class program was able to reduce rework, 
improving on the costly mistakes that caused rework on Seawolf-class. In Engineering 
the Solution, Johnson et al. (n.d.) stated that the implementation of Lean Six Sigma 
resulted in noticeable cost savings in rework, risk, and delays over the initial several 
ships, specifically in non-propulsion electric systems. 
e. Software Design 
Virginia-class was solely designed using CAD software through all four current 
design blocks. The employment of the software allowed several design modifications in 
the planning phase without the requirement of costly models or drawings after each 
change (Schank et al., 2011). 
The use of CAD contributed to a reduction of rework throughout the design 
process and assisted in making required changes when moving from one block to the 
next. The use of CAD in comparison to previous methods resulted in a much more rapid 
development of drawings that were far superior in quality through their accuracy. Three 
years into construction, 99% of the Virginia-class’ drawings had been issued in 
comparison to 65% on Seawolf-class, and the number of errors identifying changes 
required was 12,000 for Virginia-class in comparison to 70,000 for Seawolf-class, an 
80% reduction (Schank et al., 2011). The overall reduction in rework translates into lower 
design and labor cost reductions, ultimately controlling cost growth in the program.  
The combination of the evolution in software design and the management of the 
program utilizing MATs drastically increased efficiency in the build process over 
Seawolf-class. These tools place Virginia-class 2.5 years ahead of Seawolf-class at the 
time of construction start when measured by the number of drawings issued (Schank et 
al., 2011). 
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f. Only Mature Technology 
An additional area where containment of cost growth was targeted were those 
costs attributable to non-mature technology. From the outset, the program prohibited new 
technologies that either were not previously approved as a part of production on previous 
submarines, or were not fully tested on a Los Angeles-class submarine prior to inclusion 
in the Virginia-class program. Table 1 represents the understood risks of technologies at 
different stages of maturity. The paradigm of payoff versus risk, when inserting non-
proven technology into production, was considered and discussed on the U.S. Senate 
floor on July 21, 1992.  
 
Levels of Technology Maturity 
 
Maturity Category Risk Technology Base 
Proven  N/A Los Angeles-class  
Demonstrated N/A Seawolf-class 
Demonstrated or will be 
demonstrated  
Low Post-Seawolf-class/ Near 
term 
Requires significant 




Projects Agency (DARPA) 
structural initiatives 
Table 1.   Virginia-Class Levels of Technology Maturity (after U.S. Senate, 1992) 
4. Special Congressional Oversight 
Congress decided that after the Seawolf-class they would provide additional 
oversight for the next attack submarine.  The previous cost overruns in the acquisition of 
the Seawolf-class had shaken congressional confidence in the Navy’s ability to manage 
submarine acquisition. In response to the previous cost overruns, Congress decided that 
the Virginia-class would receive special oversight to control cost growth. 
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a. Loss of Confidence 
Congress and the Navy sought to make the new attack submarine (referred to as 
NAS in congressional proceedings) affordable long before construction began. The 
Virginia-class would have a focus on affordability early in the acquisition phase and 
throughout the life cycle. In Senate proceedings on September 13, 1991, during the 
hearing on the forthcoming Centurion-class (which became the Virginia-class), the main 
focus of testimony centered on how the NAS would be more affordable than the new 
Seawolf-class with less concern for capability improvements. Navy testimony stated that 
affordable would “be anything that costs less than Seawolf-class” (U.S. Senate, 1994). In 
contrast, Congress had a more exact definition of how Centurion-class would be 
affordable. They defined affordable as “a submarine that will fit in the shipbuilding and 
conversion budgets of the future” (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2014a; U.S. Senate, 
1994). 
Congress established that future funding would first depend on the quarterly 
reports from William Perry, the secretary of defense. The increased reporting was aimed 
at controlling costs of the new submarine to prevent a repeat of the unpopular cost growth 
incurred during the acquisition of the Seawolf-class. The increased congressional 
oversight was unsuccessful in averting cost growth in the initial submarines of the 
Virginia-class (U.S. Senate, 1994). 
The original PAUC target at Senate hearings was $1.765 billion (2010 dollars). 
That number grew to an estimate of $2.014 (2010 dollars) at the start of production and 
has since been adjusted through rebaselining in 2005 to a new target of $2.185 billion per 
boat. Despite the increased congressional oversight, the Virginia-class program incurred a 
cost overrun of $420 million, or 20% over the original PAUC estimates proposed at 




b. Meeting Cost Goals 
The cost goals for Virginia-class were not met initially. As the learning curve in 
production was improved, costs came down and significant savings were accomplished 
later in the program. The recent submarine completions and those under construction 
(SSN 781, SSN 782, SSN 783, SSN 784, SSN 785, SSN 786, and SSN 787) have 
attained the adjusted cost goals. Table 2 represents these submarines and their estimated 
cost at completion, as compared to the current 2010 APB. This data does not represent 
the costs incurred on SSN 774, SSN 775, SSN 776, SSN 777, SSN 778, SSN 779, and 
SSN 780 due to classification levels of the data that are inconsistent with this report. Data 
from Table 2 reflect improved efficiencies in the acquisition of Virginia-class as 
experience is gained through SSN 787. Reduced cost growth in acquisition is projected 
on these submarines; they represent the eighth through 14th submarines of the class. 
Sources of cost savings include the following: 
 schedule variance through effective schedule maintenance; 
 efficient completion of a milestone (completion of the pressure hull) 
resulting in cost variance; 
 contract optimizing efforts of labor, effective man-hour use; 
 favorable cost variance due to favorable performance in final assembly 
and testing before final delivery; 
 reduced labor costs due to schedule variance created by efficient 
integration and testing facilities; 
 modular fabrication; and 
 reduction in rework on SSN 783 as compared with previous submarines 
(DAMIR, 2011a, 2012a). 
An “unfavorable variance” is where the actual cost or outcome is greater than the 
expected or estimated outcome. In the case of Virginia-class, the sources of unfavorable 
variances are as follows: 
 authorized contract change orders (scope creep), 
 overtime labor costs to avoid a schedule variance,  
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 inaccurate estimates of man-hours required to perform required tasks 
(modular integration), and 
 schedule variance caused by labor hour degradation in structural 
component fabrication and assembly (DAMIR, 2012a). 
 























SSN 781 $2.145 $1.50 (.31) $3.069 $2.139 (.31) 
SSN 782 $2.145 $1.516 (.30) $3.069 $2.165 (.30) 
SSN 783 $2.145 $1.596 (.26) $3.069 $2.156 (.30) 
SSN 784 $2.145 $1.873 (.13) $3.069 $2.673 (.13) 
SSN 785 $2.145 $1.820 (.16) $3.069 $2.540 (.08) 
SSN 786 $2.145 $1.716 (.20) $3.069 $2.519 (.08) 
SSN 787 $2.145 $1.778 (.18) $3.069 $2.544 (.08) 
Table 2.   Cost Variance in Billions (USD), Converted to 2010 Dollars  
(after DAMIR, 2010a, 2011a, 2012a)  
Note. Due to classification levels of cost data on hulls 774–780 that are not compatible 
with this report, only a portion of cost data is displayed in Table 2. 
 
C. FIRST VIRGINIA-CLASS CONSTRUCTION 
Initial construction commenced in September 1998 with the construction of USS 
Virginia (SSN 774), which entered service in 2004. The new class had evolved from data 
collected and experience on the Los Angeles-class of attack submarines (Goff et al., 
2012). 
SSN 774 cost $3.182 billion (PAUC), 2010 dollars; this includes startup costs 
associated with initial construction. The APUC target was originally $2.013 billion (2010 
dollars), and the PAUC estimate was $2.014 billion. Current APUC is $2.616 billion 
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(2010 dollars), and the PAUC is $2.887 (2010 dollars). U.S. Senate (1994) testimony on 
September 13, 1995, sought a PAUC of $1.76 billion (2010 dollars) on hulls 
(unspecified) following SSN 774 versus the estimate of $2.2 billion (2010 dollars) per 
hull. Table 3 depicts this cost information in table form. 
 
Cost Measure (per 
unit) 
Navy Est. 1994 
(In Senate 
Testimony) 
1995 Baseline 2010 Baseline Current Estimate 
2012 SAR 
PAUC N/A 2.176 3.069 2.887 
APUC 2.2 2.014 2.810 2.616 
Table 3.   Virginia-Class Controlled Cost Growth and Acquired New Submarines  
Below the Baseline Values Only After the Baseline was Adjusted  
(after DAMIR, 2012a) 
The cost growth in comparison to established baselines is +29.91 for APUC and 
+32.66 for PAUC, resulting in a Nunn–McCurdy Breach. Since rebaselining, the PAUC 
has -5.93% cost growth and APUC -6.92. Table 4 depicts the change in cost variance in 
the 1995 and 2005 baselines. 
Category 1995 Baseline 2005 Baseline 
PAUC +32.66* (5.93) 
APUC +29.91 (6.92) 
Table 4.   Cost Growth by Variance  
Note. * Indicates Nunn–McCurdy Breach 
 
D. VIRGINIA-CLASS CONTRACT 
Virginia-class was originally contracted under a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) 
contract for the electric plant and later added cost-plus-award fee for the construction of 
the ship (Schank et al., 2011). Electric Boat designed the Virginia-class submarine. The 
contract was established as a sole-source design and build for the first ship of the class. 
The Navy originally planned to procure Virginia-class from a sole-source 
shipyard on the lead ship of the class, the USS Virginia, whereby the contract to design 
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and build would be awarded on a sole source basis. This measure was recommended 
following the Seawolf-class program as a way to reduce costs. The measure, however, 
was not implemented. Instead, a consortium of two shipyards was planned for the 
building of the first four ships of the class. EB was the sole design agent and prime 
contractor for the program, while Newport News was a major subcontractor, executing 
approximately 50% of the work on every other submarine constructed (Schank et al., 
2011). 
The USS Virginia was designed and built at Electric Boat; the decision to award a 
design and build contract to a single company was made following the lessons learned 
from the Seawolf-class. This recommendation is studied in depth in the RAND 
Corporation’s Learning From Experience (Schank et al., 2011), in which the Seawolf-
class and Ohio-class are compared with Virginia-class. Although Virginia-class did 
sustain cost growth on the initial build at both shipyards, the cost growth was less than 
incurred on the first submarine of both Ohio-class and Seawolf-class. As described by the 
RAND Corporation, this practice of single-source designs and builds for the first 
submarine of the class “sets the tone” for the program (Schank et al., 2011). 
SSN 781 through SSN 787 were contracted under fixed-price incentive fee (FPIF) 
awarded on a competitive contract to General Dynamics and Electric Boat Corporation 
(GDEB). The RDT&E contract, awarded under a lead yard services contract, was most 
recently awarded to GDEB under a CPFF structure. The initial decision to utilize two 
shipyards for SSN 774, SSN 775, SSN 776, and SSN 777 has been extended through the 
current build and will likely continue through Block IV in January 2014. The Virginia-
class builds to date, as organized in block build, are reflected in Table 5 (DAMIR, 2011a, 
2012a). 
Block Hull Numbers 
1 SSN 774–777 
2 SSN 778–783 
3 SSN 784–791 
4 SSN 792-TBD 
Table 5.   Virginia-Class Block Build Schedule (after U.S. Navy, Commander  
Submarine Forces Atlantic, 2013) 
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1. Utilizing Two Shipyards 
The two shipyards selected to build Virginia-class were Electric Boat, Inc., of 
Groton, CT, and Newport News Naval Shipyard in Virginia, which also builds and 
refuels Nimitz-class and Ford-class aircraft carriers. The construction of two submarines 
per year was beneficial because it provided enough work to employ the workers of two 
shipyards simultaneously, it alleviated a single point of vulnerability in the event of a 
wartime attack on shipbuilding, and it provided replacement submarines for the existing 
submarines as they were decommissioned. The constant production of two submarines 
allows the Navy to meet national security requirements (DAMIR, 2012a; Johnson et al., 
n.d.; Schank et al., 2011). The initial four submarines were built jointly between the two 
shipyards. Subsequent contracts are planned as a sole-source contract while keeping 
existing business practices in place. 
The major component division of labor is described in The VIRGINIA Class 
Submarine Program: A Case Study, by General Dynamics–Electric Boat (2010, p. 33): 
EB is the lead design contractor and lead construction contractor while 
NNS is a co-construction contractor. EB and NNS will final-assemble 
alternate ships, EB delivering the SSN774 and SSN776, and NNS 
delivering SSN775 and SSN777. The construction work is evenly split 
between EB and NNS. Modules and hull cylinders are fabricated at EB 
Quonset Point, RI, and shipped by barge to the two final assemblers – EB 
Groton, CT, and NNS. NNS fabricates modules and installs them in hull 
cylinders for final assembly in their shipyard or ships them by barge to EB 
Groton for final assembly. Each shipbuilder manufactures the same 
section for every ship with one exception that is always manufactured by 
the final assembly/delivery yard. 
The use of two shipyards in the construction of the Virginia-class has been successful in 
meeting goal of employing two shipyards while still producing a high-quality product. 
The collaboration between the Navy and contractors, in all phases of production and 
through the co-location of teams with each team being present in the other shipyard, is 
the key to these two builders consistently producing Virginia-class submarines that pass 
the Navy’s acceptance trials (General Dynamics–Electric Boat, 2010). 
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2. Military Industrial Complex 
One of the primary drivers behind the early decommissioning of several Los 
Angeles-class submarines at mid-life refueling was an effort to protect the military-
industrial complex by providing a steady supply of new contracts for submarine 
construction. As of 2013, 20 of the 62 Los Angeles-class submarines have been 
decommissioned (Schank et al., 2011). 
The initial Virginia-class acquisition strategy was to design and build at a single 
shipyard, Electric Boat, for the entire Virginia-class (Schank et al., 2011). The decision 
was later reversed because a modified build plan required that SSN 775 and beyond 
would be constructed in a collaborative effort from two shipyards. This decision—
described in The VIRGINIA Class Submarine Program: A Case Study (General 
Dynamics–Electric Boat, 2010) and the RAND Corporations’ Learning From 
Experience: Volume II (Schank et al., 2011)—was made by the U.S. Congress in the 
interest of protecting national security. Lawmakers believed that concentrating skills and 
abilities for the construction of nuclear-propulsion submarines in one shipyard left them 
vulnerable and did not provide Congress with sufficient industrial scalability in the event 
of rapid escalation of submarine construction (Schank et al., 2011).  
E. INITIAL ACQUISITION SOURCES OF COST GROWTH 
1. Seawolf-Class 
Rework costs on Seawolf-class were the most significant driver of cost increases 
in the program. Incomplete drawings were often issued to start production on immature 
designs that had not yet been proven in testing, resulting in rework when modification or 
replacement was required (Schank et al., 2011). 
To express the cost growth in terms of budgeted dollars, the sources of cost 
growth for the acquisition grew by the following amounts (expressed in percentage and 
based on data supplied that compares all data in base year for the Seawolf-class): 1990: 
RDT&E +320.7.  
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Specific contributors of cost growth were as follows:  
 schedule +18.1 
 engineering +141.0 
 estimating +108.0 
 support +52.3.  
The procurement budget category was negative because procurement was halted 
at three submarines; however, cost growth within the estimating budget subcategory grew 
by +952.9% (DAMIR, 1999a). 
2. Virginia-Class Cost Overage Sources 
There were numerous sources of cost overages for the Virginia-class submarine.  
The acquisition and industry experts never stopped combatting the unfavorable cost 
variances.  The concerted efforts by these acquisition professionals were successful over 
time. 
a. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
The largest source of cost growth in the RDT&E category on the original baseline 
of the Virginia-class program was in the engineering subcategory with a $556 million 
(1995 dollars) growth above the 1995 estimate. The RDT&E category, estimating that the 
subcategory had a favorable cost variance of ($111.2) million (1995 dollars), the total 
RDT&E variance was $445 million (1995 dollars; DAMIR, 2012a). Table 6 reflects the 
cost variances of the program. 
Changes in estimating have since resulted in an additional $184 million (1995 
dollars) favorable variance. Specific drivers of this cost reduction are a reduction in the 
following, expressed in 1995 dollars: 
 RTOC estimating $91.3 million;  




 estimating process improvements for hull, mechanical, and electrical 
(HM&E) and combat systems improvements $73.9 million; and 
 estimating $2.9 million. 
The current RDT&E summary is $261 million (1995 dollars) unfavorable over the 
initial estimate (DAMIR, 2012a). 
 
 RDT&E Procurement Total 
SAR Baseline 
(prod est.) 
6351.2 86856.1 93207.3 
Previous Changes    
Economic +6.9 +3575.1 +3582.0 
Schedule  392.7 392.7 
Engineering 798.0  798.0 
Estimating (162.6) (4307.8) (4470.4) 
Support  (233.4) (233.4) 
Subtotal 642.3 (573.4) 68.9 
Current Changes    
Economic 36 1758.8 1794.8 
Quantity 0 0 0 
Schedule 0 (1845.3) (1845.3) 
Estimating (264.3) (1126.4) (1428.8) 
Total Changes 414 (1773.9) (1359.9) 
Table 6.   Virginia-Class Cost Variances, 1995 Dollars (after DAMIR, 2012a) 
3. Virginia-Class Procurement 
The largest source of cost growth was schedule overruns with $129.7 million 
(1995 dollars) when comparing the initial schedule with cost incurred. Support had a 
favorable cost variance of $158.7 million (1995 dollars) and estimating was favorable 
($2613.6 million in 1995 dollars; DAMIR, 2012a). 
Changes in procurement have resulted in a favorable variance of $877.2 million 
(1995 dollars) and $599.1 million (1995 dollars) in estimating. The only unfavorable cost 
in procurement is support at $13.2 million (1995 dollars). The acceleration of 
procurement by moving a 2020 ship to 2014 and gaining favorable economic terms 
resulted in savings of $877.2 million (1995 dollars), estimate revision resulted in a 
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savings of $638.5 million (1995 dollars), adjustment for prior escalation estimates $291.5 
million (1995 dollars), reduction to estimates of the technology insertion program 
estimates $52.5 million (1995 dollars), revised estimate for spares $3.4 million (1995 
dollars), a revised estimate for shipbuilding and conversion $4.8 million (1995 dollars), 
and an adjustment for current and prior support escalation $1.3 million (1995 dollars). 
Sources of cost growth are as follows: advance procurement funding for 2018 class 
extension estimating $314.6 million (1995 dollars), revised estimates due to refinement 
of requirements caused by estimates $73.6 million (1995 dollars), and modified estimate 
for initial spares $17.9 million (1995 dollars; DAMIR, 2012a). 
Significant favorable cost variances continue to be realized in part through labor 
and fixed shipyard overhead reduction costs. A major contributor to these savings is the 
refined modular design build process, which contributed to the USS Mississippi (SSN 
782) delivery 12 months early. Although improvements in labor costs do not occur in 
every submarine, a relationship between cost and schedule variance exists. 
USS Virginia (SSN 774) was delivered to the Navy in 2004 with a total schedule 
variance of four months. This overrun reflects a significant improvement over the 
performance of previous programs of Ohio-class and Seawolf-class. The first Ohio-class 
was delivered 19 months late, and the first Seawolf-class was 25 months late (Schank et 
al., 2011). 
4. Material Costs 
Contributors to unfavorable material cost variances are mixed but represent 43% 
of cost growth. Specific sources are increases in supplier costs of material in excess of 
40% beyond estimates and fewer suppliers of highly specialized material. Despite 
focused efforts to curb excess costs incurred in Seawolf-class and Ohio-Class, cost 
growth was incurred due to a lack of design maturity in specialized electronic 
components (DAMIR, 2012a; Schank et al., 2011). 
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5. Inaccurate Estimates 
Labor costs on the Virginia-class were underestimated by 40%. The contributors 
to this growth were as follows: 
 increases in wages at Newport News Shipyard, 
 new product introduction at Newport News Shipyard, and 
 new workforce at Newport News Shipyard. 
These increases were caused by a combination of their lack of recent experience 
in building submarines, familiarity with the Virginia-class, retooling processes, and a 
shift in the local knowledge of the workforce who were more experienced in working on 
Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. Additionally, supply chain management failures resulted in 
work delays. A number of key parts were not available when scheduled in the build 
process (Schank et al., 2011). 
Even though these inaccurate estimates for the Virginia-class were closer to actual 
cost estimates in comparison to previous nuclear-powered submarines, it should be 
recognized that the first units of nearly all expensive acquisition programs (ACAT 1 C/D) 
exceed cost estimates. Nuclear-powered submarines and related facilities have 
consistently exceeded cost estimates by a significant margin on initial units (Birkler et al., 
1994). 
The Navy’s method for estimating the number of ships and submarines that it will 
need to build has a fundamental flaw: The Navy has been unable to accurately project the 
likelihood of cost growth. As referenced in the February 2005 GAO report, Improved 
Management Practices Could Help Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding 
Programs, the Navy does not account for the probability of cost growth when estimating 
costs. This most recently occurred in the early builds of the Virginia-class, prior to 
rebaselining. This failure to account for cost growth, historically speaking, results in 
program cost overruns.  
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6. Changing Requirements 
Another source of cost growth for the Virginia-class program was a change in 
bubble pulse regulations. This regulation change affected how the ship was designed and 
created cost growth through redesign work. Changes to acoustic requirements resulted in 
redesign work from original specifications. These examples of scope creep increased 
costs in procurement. 
7. Personnel 
The costs to reconstitute a workforce and suppliers capable of designing and 
building a new submarine that has been allowed to atrophy during periods of inactivity is 
high in comparison to other ACAT 1 programs. In the study The U.S. Submarine 
Production Base (Birkler et al., 1994), the following excerpt was provided:  
Personnel-related reconstitution costs dominate. This is true across all 
cases and all restart years. The costs of rebuilding a workforce account for 
two-thirds to 90 percent of all shipyard reconstitution costs in submarine 
construction. The reasons for this are given in the factors listed in the 
description of the workforce model: Not only is it necessary to account for 
hiring and training, but also for the inefficiency of newly hired workers 
and the need to allocate fixed shipyard overhead to the few boats that a 
slowly growing workforce can simultaneously build. (p. 40) 
Virginia-class was not immune to these findings. Further analysis and relationship 
recognition is covered in following sections. 
F. COST REDUCTION 
Cost overruns on the Seawolf-class drove the Navy to focus on controlling cost 
growth on the Virginia-class. Seawolf-class was not designed and built at the same 
location, thus contributing to cost and schedule overruns. Designing and building 
Virginia-class at the same location was a must. A major source of cost-growth reduction 
was to eradicate the cost growth experienced on Seawolf-class as a result of concurrent 
development and ship construction (Schank et al., 2011).  
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1. Understanding and Implementing Lessons Learned  
Not repeating the mistakes made on Seawolf-class was a priority to the Navy and 
was seen as a great enabler to controlling cost growth and reducing risk. The most 
common factor in cost growth is the current estimating system that does not factor in 
sensitivity analysis for risk. The reduction of risk was soon a key to making Virginia-
class affordable and surviving as an acquisition. Not replicating the mistakes made in the 
Seawolf-class was accomplished through reviews of lessons learned in the acquisition of 
the program.  
The following were key tenants of the Seawolf-class lessons learned: 
 insertion of only mature technology; 
 strengthening the specification development and approval process; 
 logistics and identifying critical components who will supply them early in 
the program; 
 reducing the combat system development risk; 
 economies of scale through building two boats at once; and 
 economies of scale through utilizing the resources, including labor pool at 
two shipyards (Schank et al., 2011). 
2. Initial Incentive Systems 
The Earned Value Management System (EVMS) was employed by the PM 
through cost performance indices (CPIs) and schedule performance indices (SPIs) to 
monitor construction progress (Schank et al., 2011). Examples of specific employment of 
EVMS in construction were comparisons of drawing type versus schedule, production 
plan versus schedule, and special instruction packages versus schedule (Schank et al., 
2011).  
Despite the close relationship that EVMS created between the budget and 
construction schedule, it did not stop the decisions which resulted in cost growth of USS 
Virginia. A 32.66% PAUC, which resulted in a Nunn–McCurdy breach, and a 29.91% 
APUC were incurred in the original baseline (DAMIR, 2012a). 
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Part of the cost growth on the initial block is attributable to requirements scope 
creep as experienced through “bubble pulse” regulations. This change had a cascading 
effect through design and acoustic signatures, requiring redesign work (Schank et al., 
2011).  
3. Mandated Competition through Duopoly 
Sourcing submarines through two shipyards for national security considerations 
was one of the drivers behind the decision to source it from two locations. Because 
neither shipyard had a monopoly on the construction to force competitive prices, cost 
growth was controlled. Following congressional approval that would assign 
approximately 50% of the work on each submarine to both shipyards, GDEB and 
Northrop Grumman–Newport News established an agreement that profits would be split 
down the middle between the two builders after each submarine was delivered to the 
Navy (GAO, 2003). 
Contracts on new construction of the Block IV submarines, starting in 2014, will 
be a sole-source contract to GDEB with 50% of the work being contracted to Northrop 
Grumman–Newport News. The profits of the contract will continue to be split 50/50, as 
in previous builds.  
Most large defense acquisitions in the Navy last for several years; dividing 
production into build batches is referred to as blocks. Improvements or changes in the 
program are typically made when a new block build is started. In the case of the Virginia-
class submarine, Block IV will have 10 submarines and will be in place from 2014 to 
2018 until Block V supersedes it. Block IV is consistent with a five-year contract for 10 
submarines, five to each contractor. Changes in Block IV are modeled to achieve savings 
in the O&S phase of the Virginia-class’ life cycle (DAMIR, 2012a). 
4. Communication with Vendors 
Virginia-class brought the major vendors that supplied components for 
construction closer and made them a part of the process. This brought the supplier closer 
to the buyer and removed the spatial and perceived distance that commonly exists in 
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production. Although the Navy’s position of the design authority had not changed, the 
vendors were now included and had the ability to provide meaningful input into the 
process of reducing costs of the program without compromising performance (Schank et 
al., 2011). 
5. Construction Efficiencies  
Construction efficiencies were gained by improving on a previous modular design 
used in the construction of the Ohio-class. The initial build had 10 modules that were 
later reduced to four super modules. This change resulted in decreased construction time 
and fixed overhead costs. 
The reduction of construction time was a major focus in lowering the per-unit cost 
of the program. Each day that a submarine is in production, the costs of labor and fixed 
overhead costs contribute to the overall cost of construction. Shortening production time 
results in lower costs of production and contributes to controlling cost growth. The source 
of the decision to move to four super modules was the Virginia-class PM reducing 
construction time from 88 to 60 months (R. Sykes, personal communication, January 18, 
2014).  
6. Threat of Cancellation 
In 2005, the Navy and the Virginia-class program office were given a goal and 
ultimatum by Admiral Mike Mullen: Reduce the cost of each Virginia-class submarine or 
face program cancellation. This sobering reality can be viewed as the catalyst that turned 
the program around through controlling, and in some cases, reversing cost growth 
(Johnson et al., n.d., p. 4). 
Following Admiral Mullen’s ultimatum, GDEB submitted a proposal to the 
Virginia-class program office on a course of action to reduce costs to a level at or below 
Admiral Mullen’s established $2 billion level. The proposal consisted of the following 
elements: 
 determine the cost drivers from construction costs to date; 
 develop cost targets and specify reductions from cost area; 
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 develop a cost framework to guide decisions about cost reduction efforts; 
and 
 establish a comprehensive program plan to integrate and implement the 
effort (Johnson et al., n.d.). 
The impact of this ultimatum cannot be overstated; when the program faced 
cancellation, the trend toward cost growth was reversed. Although a qualitative 
consideration, this appears to be more effective in spurring beneficial evolutionary 
improvements than the traditional incremental approach to process improvement.  
The Virginia-class’ cost growth was ultimately brought under control, but it is 
unknown whether the various teams would have been as effective if they had not been 
motivated by this unavoidable mandate. The chief of naval operations’ (CNO’s) “if-then” 
execution orders led to a clear, defined goal of controlling cost, and ultimately to the 
program office’s successful reduction in costs. This unwavering cost threshold led to the 
contractor hiring Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) and the implementation of a broad-ranging 
and innovative cost reduction effort. 
G. LESSONS LEARNED 
1. Virginia-Class 
The most significant lesson learned in designing and building the Virginia-class 
was not to repeat the mistakes of previous submarine acquisition programs, but to make 
corrections and/or improvements before construction work commenced. In qualitative 
terms, the relative success that the Navy is enjoying in the procurement of Virginia-class 
submarines can be attributed to a culmination of management efforts. Management 
efforts, made prior to construction, focused on not repeating the mistakes of previous 
acquisition programs and on inserting innovative practices into the program. Certainly, 
there was cost growth incurred in the program, some due to inaccuracy in estimate 
assumptions and some due to design changes. Some cost growth was due to factors that 
could not have been accurately projected in the design phase, such as healthcare and 
employee wage inflation, which far outpaced the consumer price index (CPI). Ultimately, 
the various RTOC enablers, such as IPTs, use of the IPT framework, and the policy of 
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standardization and commonality in design contributed to meet the goal of achieving 
affordability. 
2. Focus 
The primary focus of the program was to control costs while developing a 
versatile submarine. The necessity of this aim was punctuated when the CNO’s 
ultimatum to procure two submarines for $4 billion (in CY 2005 dollars) in 2012 was 
issued. This mandated required a reduction in sailaway costs or else lose the Virginia-
class along with losing major business infrastructures within the military-industrial base 
due to closures driven by contract cancelations. Meeting this ultimatum required that 
$400 million in costs per submarine be cut. The increase in urgency that followed 
resulted in decisions, innovations, and enablers, leading to not only the halting of cost 
growth but also actual procurement savings and projected savings for the future 
operations and sustainment phase of the program (O’Rourke, 2013). 
The Virginia-class was built to compete with the most advanced submarines in the 
world, but the majority of the technology incorporated was mature and available, and 
unlike similar programs, was not the primary driver of the program. For Virginia-class, 
the focus on cost savings has allowed the program to control cost growth more effectively 
in comparison to other ACAT 1D acquisitions (DAMIR, 2012a). 
3. Integrated Master Schedule 
The integrated master schedule (IMS) provided cohesiveness between major 
contributors in the design and construction of Virginia-class. The IMS resulted in the 
completion of 99% of Virginia-class drawings after three years, a great improvement in 
comparison to Seawolf-class’ 65% at the three-year mark (DAMIR, 2012a). 
4. Iterative Process 
The Virginia-class process continues to achieve procurement savings as they 
begin the Block IV build of the program. One of the major success stories in the process 
is the cost savings that came as a result of improvements to the modular build approach. 
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The submarine originally consisted of 10 modules that were later pieced together to form 
super modules.  
Reducing the number of modules, starting with USS New Hampshire (SSN 778), 
resulted in significant cost savings, as only four super modules were required in the 
submarine. The reduction in the number of modules to four positively contributed to the 
reduction in build time from 84 to 60 months per submarine, directly reducing the PAUC 
as well (Johnson et al., n.d.). 
5. Tradeoff 
Virginia-class represents a possible shift in future acquisitions in which precious 
DOD procurement dollars will be in greater demand. The fall of the Soviet Union 
resulted in Congress and the Navy procuring a submarine on cost through a compromise 
in capability (e.g., quietness, firepower, targeted capability) to accept enough quantity to 
meet force structure requirements.  
6. Capital Expenditures 
In support of the Virginia-class program, the Navy made a relatively small 
investment in capital expenditures initially. An initial investment of $9.4 million was 
made at the Electric Boat Quonset Point Facility that is projected to save $71 million in 
manufacturing costs over the life of the 30 shipbuilding programs. Total capital 
investments of $63 million are expected to yield $422 million in savings through the 
fiscal year (FY) 2020 submarine. The program’s capital investments are considered 








IV. SAN ANTONIO-CLASS SHIP STUDY 
This chapter informs readers of the specifics of the U.S. Navy’s San Antonio-
class amphibious ships, giving the reader an understanding of the industry in order to 
comprehend the acquisition of this vessel. The term LPD derives from the Navy coding 
system for vessel types; amphibious (L), transport (P), and dock (D) ships are knows as 
LPDs. This chapter relies heavily on the previous work of Ronald O’Rourke (2011), 
specialist in Naval Affairs, in his Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: 
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress. The full report is available through the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS). 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE SAN ANTONIO CLASS 
The San Antonio-class program began in the 1990s to replace four different 
amphibious class ships that were either already retired or, in the case of the Austin-class 
ship, preparing to retire. With the lead ship, the USS San Antonio (LPD-17), construction 
began in August 2000 and was delivered to the Navy in July 2005. The mission of the 
amphibious class ship is to transport marines and their equipment in support of military 
operations on shore. Amphibious ships have been used increasingly in non-combat 
situations, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions, since they are 
ideally suited to perform this role.  
1. Amphibious Force Structure 
To support the marines in their ability to conduct operations, the Navy has 
requested a 33-ship amphibious force. The Navy’s amphibious forces are made up of six 
classes of ships (amphibious inventory as of November 2013):  
 (8) Wasp-class (LHD-1) 
 (1) Tarawa-class (LHA-1) 
 (8) San Antonio-class (LPD-17) 
 (3) Austin-class (LPD-4)  
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 (8) Whidbey Island-class (LSD-41)  
 (4) Harpers Ferry-class (LSD-49) (U.S. Navy, 2013) 
The San Antonio-class will have a total of 11 ships. Currently, eight LPDs have 
been built, the latest commissioning April 6, 2013. There are two LPDs under 
construction and a final LPD authorized for construction. These three ships will replace 
the remaining LPD-4 class ships when they are decommissioned. The Senate 
Appropriations Bill for 2013 has provided funding for the initial acquisition of a 12th 
LPD-17 (Inouye, 2012). 
2. LPD-17 Acquisition Background 
After a competed bidding process, Avondale Industries was awarded a $641 
million cost-plus-award-fee contract in 1996 for engineering and manufacturing 
development. The San Antonio-class was built to support the Marine Corps warfighting 
concept “Operational Maneuver from the Sea,” as well as to replace outdated amphibious 
ships (Office of the Inspector General, 1998). The capabilities requirements for the San 
Antonio-class are as follows: 
 conducting over-the-horizon landing operations; 
 carrying assault vehicles and landing craft; 
 allowing the AV-8 to land and take off from the flight deck; 
 reducing radar cross section; and 
 carrying compartments configured for amphibious craft logistics support, 
aviation maintenance and medical treatment (Office of the Inspector 
General, 1998). 
The concern for controlling cost was an ever-present aspect of the San Antonio-
class program. One of the tenets of the program was to target program cost drivers. The 
understanding that paying more during the early stages to reduce costs over the 40-year 
life cycle was an important concept shaping the San Antonio-class program. After the 
Cold War, there was no single, large superpower like the USSR to contend with. Military 
leaders realized that future warships would need to be highly flexible to counter unknown 
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threats. Designing ships to be flexible can be problematic if these capabilities interfere 
with other desired mission activities. One example of this type of design problem that 
occurred during the San Antonio-class program design process was the requirement for 
reduced radar cross-section that, in order to comply with this design requirement, created 
issues with traditional methods for using ship’s boats (Fireman, Nutting, Rivers, Carlile, 
& King, 1998). 
B. SAN ANTONIO-CLASS ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
Developing an acquisition strategy is important in providing direction and 
guidance for the program personnel. The Navy designed the acquisition strategy for the 
San Antonio-class program to accomplish three objectives: 
 operate with ease in performing mission requirements to support the 
warfighter; 
 expedite ship deliveries with no degradation of quality; and 
 install applications and products that reduce life cycle cost growth (Office 
of the Inspector General, 1998). 
To support these goals, the Navy solicited input from the warfighters and 
developed the “LPD-17 War Room.” This is where the warfighters, engineers, and 
trainers could collaborate on problems and issues to develop solutions early in the 
development process. The San Antonio-class program incorporated numerous 
management tools designed to reduce cost. The San Antonio-class program used IPTs 
consisting of subject matter experts in various fields that have developed and logistically 
supported similar systems. The focus of these efforts was to make meaningful changes 
early in the program where it would cost less than if those changes were made later. An 
important cost-saving process that was first used and developed during the San Antonio-
class program was the integrated product and process development (IPPD). 
1. Integrated Product and Process Development 
In 1995, the undersecretary of defense directed a significant change in the way 
that the DOD acquires weapon systems in that the concepts of IPPD and IPT were 
applied in the acquisition process. The DOD defines IPPD as  
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a management technique that simultaneously integrates all essential 
acquisition activities through the use of multidisciplinary teams to 
optimize the design, manufacturing and supportability processes. (Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense [OUSD], 1998, p. 1) 
There are five main principles for implementing the IPPD process: 
 customer focus, 
 concurrent development of products and processes, 
 easy and continuous life-cycle planning, 
 proactive identification and management of risk, and 
 maximum flexibility for optimization and use of contractor approaches 
(OUSD, 1998). 
The details of the IPPD process are tailored to the specific program that is using 
it. Not all programs go through the various phases or decision points that any other 
program goes through. The IPPD process is flexible in its ability to integrate various 
activities based on the requirements of each program. 
2. LPD-17 Integrated Product and Process Development 
The IPPD process was used by the program office in making decisions that would 
reduce costs. In the report LPD 17 on the Shipbuilding Frontier: Integrated Product & 
Process Development, Fireman et al. (1998) discussed the fundamentals of this tool and 
how it applied to the San Antonio-class program. For the LPD-17, the fundamental pillars 
for the IPPD were goals, people, process, and tools. These pillars, as they apply to the 
San Antonio-class program, are defined here. 
a. Goals  
(1) Satisfy Customer Requirements.  Identifying the customer can be 
difficult for a government program and not as straightforward as one would surmise. The 
customers for a government program can vary from the program office to the end user 
and ultimately the taxpayer—the people buying this system (Fireman et al., 1998).  
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(2) Reduce Total Ownership Costs.  When the San Antonio-class 
program reached milestone II in June 1996 (using current terminology, this would be 
Milestone B—entry into Engineering and Manufacturing Development), the program 
performed an analysis of the TOC drivers. The main O&S cost drivers were identified as 
manpower and maintenance. By focusing on reducing costs in these areas, the IPPD 
determined that it would be able to reduce TOC (Fireman et al., 1998).  
(3) Reduce Cycle Time .  Reducing the time taken on any step during 
the acquisition stages can reduce cost. The San Antonio-class program focused its cycle 
time reductions on the contract change, ship production, total ship testing, logistics, 
shipboard maintenance, and the government decision-making processes. The less time 
spent on each of these processes, the more the program could reduce costs. This type of 
schedule change must be carefully managed because if essential activity is omitted at a 
critical stage, it could have cost and time implications if they affect the developmental or 
manufacturing process (Fireman et al., 1998).  
(4) Reduce Program Rework.  As with any production process, the 
goal of reducing rework can lead to significant cost savings. The IPPD’s goal focused on 
eliminating possible problems in the product development phase, early in the program, to 
reduce the amount of rework in later phases. Such a goal must be carefully balanced 
against reduction in cycle time because the two may pull in opposite directions (Fireman 
et al., 1998).  
(5) Total Ship System Integration.  The integration of new ship 
systems had to be integrated into the ship’s command, control, communication, 
computers, and intelligence (C4I) infrastructure. This concept was new for a ship in 
which previously installed systems were integrated into only the mission area that it was 
going to support. With the new concept of total ship system integration, these new 
systems had to be integrated not only to their mission areas, but also into the entire ship’s 
system (Fireman et al., 1998).  
(6) Long-Term Relationship.  The San Antonio-class program is 
expected to be around for 40 years. This will require a working relationship with the 
contractors over this entire period (Fireman et al., 1998).  
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b. People  
The people involved in the IPPD system are the most important aspect to the 
success of the program. Clearly defined goals and tasks help to clarify the direction the 
IPPD will take and aid in its effectiveness. The people making up the IPTs must have the 
skills and experience in all stages of a ship’s life, and they must also be composed of 
people from both sides of the government–contractor relationship. For the San Antonio-
class, the IPTs were co-located at an agreed-upon contractor site. Being co-located meant 
that this team shared the same room on the same floor in a building. Interaction and 
communication is important for the IPTs to function properly, and placing these people in 
the same room aided in that. At the head of the IPPD structure was the program 
management team (PMT). The PMT was co-led by the PMs from both the government 
and the contractor. Below the PMT were seven IPTs. These different IPTs focused on 
different systems, products, or components for the life of the ship (Fireman et al., 1998). 
The focuses of these IPTs were as follows: 
 integrated ship electronics team (ISET), 
 distributive systems team, 
 accommodations team, 
 hull team, 
 topside team, 
 mission team, and 
 machinery team. 
Many of the issues that these teams were solving may have affected other teams. 
To ensure the IPTs were not developing problems for other teams, the IPT structure had 
four cross-product teams (CPTs). Each IPT had representation in the CPTs allowing for 
coordination and performance monitoring of their efforts to achieve reductions in total 
life-cycle costs. The four CPTs consisted of the following: 
 ownership team, 
 total ship engineering team, 
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 integrated product data environment team (IPDE), and 
 combined test team (Fireman et al., 1998). 
(1) Training.  The use of IPTs was a new approach, having been 
launched across DOD acquisition systems in 1995 and requiring extensive training of 
personnel in how these teams would work to achieve their goals. These teams were made 
up of people from different organizations with different specialties and different cultures. 
Training helped to ensure that these differences did not hinder the communication 
process or the ability to solve ship integration issues. The training consisted of three 
phases over the course of 10 weeks: (1) the focus highlighting the goals of the program, 
key processes, and rules of behavior; (2) various schedule and integration plans; and (3) a 
self-assessment process (Fireman et al., 1998).  
c. Processes 
The IPPD process is a combination of multiple series of processes that come 
together to form an effective management tool. These processes are product 
development, risk management, design for ownership, RTOC, life-cycle support, design 
integration, and management tools (Fireman et al., 1998). 
(1) Product Development Process.  The acquisition process must take 
into consideration three areas of concern (cost, schedule, and risk) that can drive costs. 
The production development process is divided into six phases. The first phase, defining 
product requirements, reviews multiple areas for detail design requirement, the most 
important being allocation of RTOC goals. The goal of one of the activities that occurs in 
the second phase, define ship systems, is to perform engineering analysis in multiple 
areas, one of which is TOC (Fireman et al., 1998). 
(2) Risk Management Process.  Risk was identified and assessed at 
each step of the process. Identifying risk early allowed the program to make decisions to 
mitigate this risk early in the design process when the cost to change was lower. A risk 
mitigation program was developed and assessed quarterly by the program management 
team (Fireman et al., 1998). 
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(3) Design for Ownership Process.  One of the key focuses of the San 
Antonio-class program was designing the product for the user. By identifying the 
customers and the users early, the program was able to focus on designing a product best 
suited for them. In order for the San Antonio-class program to do this, it included 
operators, maintainers, and trainers in the design process early to ensure that its 
requirements were included in the final product. The San Antonio-class program 
management team realized it could reduce the amount of rework that might be required if 
the customers were involved in the design process early. Finding ways to reduce rework 
can reduce the acquisition cost of a program. The enablers that were used in order to 
bring all of these players together were a series of workshops that focused on specific 
areas of concern (Fireman et al., 1998). Some of the workshops that the San Antonio-
class program used were as follows: 
 expeditionary warfare, 
 missions and capability, 
 manning requirements, 
 C4I requirements, 
 habitability requirements, 
 maintenance requirements, 
 training requirements, 
 combat cargo requirements, 
 pre-commissioning requirements, 
 mixed-gender crew and troop requirements, and 
 aviation requirements. 
The design for the ownership process used virtual mockups to obtain useful end-
user feedback. If this feedback required a change, the program manager could still make 
these changes early in development while the cost to do that was low (Fireman et al., 
1998). 
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(4) Reduced Total Ownership Cost Process . As mentioned earlier, 
RTOC was an important focus for the San Antonio-class program. The program team 
focused on all known cost drivers and developed tools or policies that led to better ways 
to reduce cost. The program team identified high-level design activities in the master 
integrated work schedule (MIRWS), and when each of these activities began, a meeting 
was held, composed of members from the various CPTs. During these meetings, a 
collection of lessons learned and opportunities to reduce TOC were discussed and, if 
found, forwarded to Program Management Ships: San Antonio-Class (PMS 317) change 
control board (CCB; Fireman et al., 1998). 
(5) Life-Cycle Support Process.  An important area in reducing TOC 
is to focus on the cost over the entire life cycle of the system. Both the contractor and the 
government must develop plans that consider the cost associated with running a program 
throughout its life. The San Antonio-class program included, in the Avondale contract, a 
line item option for life-cycle support planning. This contract line item number (CLIN 
009) was exercised in October 1998 (DAMIR, 1999b; Fireman et al., 1998). 
(6)  Design Integration Testing.  Ensuring the systems were compliant 
with the total ship integration concept required significant testing throughout the design 
process. The goal of incorporating design integration testing early in the development of 
these systems was meant to reduce the amount of possible rework that may be required 
once these systems were in production or just before the delivery of the ship (Fireman et 
al., 1998). 
(7) Management Processes.  In order to effectively manage the various 
aspects of the San Antonio-class program, the PMT developed the following processes: 
government representatives at Avondale, the MIRWS process, the change process, and 
the IPDE process. The government detachment was composed of representatives with 
sufficient technical, legal, contract, and financial authority to effectively resolve issues 
early at the shipbuilding site. As mentioned in subsection 4 above, the MIRWS process 
was the tool that the program used to manage activities. This process linked and 
connected various schedules, resources, and events together to create and manage the 
program timeline. This system identified key milestones and their associated exit criteria. 
70 
The goal of this system was to reduce the amount of rework associated with items that 
were started early in the timeline (Fireman et al., 1998). 
The IPPD process was started early in the San Antonio-class program and 
required flexibility to change and evolve as the program progressed. Bringing customers 
and team members together early in the acquisition process can help reduce cost 
(Fireman et al., 1998). 
C. FIRST SAN ANTONIO-CLASS CONSTRUCTION 
The San Antonio-class was the first Navy shipbuilding program aimed at 
minimizing military specifications and standards (MILSPECS). By foregoing the 
traditional requirements for MILSPECS during construction, the contractor could 
capitalize on cost savings by using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies (Office 
of the Inspector General, 1996). Initial construction commenced with the USS San 
Antonio (LPD-17) in August 2000, and the ship was commissioned in 2005.  
1. Initial Estimates 
The San Antonio-class program had an initial PAUC of $751.55 million. This 
included startup costs associated with initial construction. Table 7 shows the difference in 
the PAUC and the APUC from 1996 to 2012 in millions of U.S. dollars 
 
Cost Measure (per unit) May 1997 APB Current Estimate 
2012 SAR 
Over Initial Cost 
PAUC 751.55 1292.782 72% 
APUC 743.825 1282.227 72% 
Table 7.   A Per Unit Cost Comparison in the Acquisition of the  
San Antonio-Class (after DAMIR, 1997b, 2012b) 
2. Acquisition Timeline 
The PAUC and APUC changed throughout the life of the San Antonio-class 
program. An intial baseline was established in May 1997. Table 8 shows the initial cost 
per unit estimate and the May 1997 baseline. 
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Cost Measure (per unit) May 1997 APB Current Estimate 
Dec 1997 SAR 
Cost Per Unit  
Dec 1997 SAR 
PAUC 9018.6 8729.9 729.158 
APUC 8925.9 8649.8 720.817 
Table 8.   A Total Program Comparison of Cost Estimates in the Acquisition  
of the San Antonio-Class (after DAMIR, 1997b) 
The change from the baseline to the December 1997 estimate was mainly in the 
procurement funds in adjusting for current and prior inflation and revising the estimate 
for combat systems capability. The contract awarded to Avondale in December 1996 had 
a target price of $641 million with a PM-estimated price at completion of $646.7 million 
(DAMIR, 1997b). Table 9 shows these changes against the May 1997 baseline.  
 
Cost Measure (per unit) May 1997 APB Current Estimate 
Dec 1998 SAR 
Cost Per Unit 
PAUC 9018.6 8732.4 727.7 
APUC 8925.9 8633.9 719.492 
Table 9.   A Comparison of Cost Estimates in the Acquisition of the  
San Antonio-Class from 1997 to 1998 (after DAMIR, 1998) 
The PM estimated the price at completion to be $666.6 million with negative cost 
and schedule variances. The negative cost variance was attributed to an increase in the 
training required for the new IPPD teams and the requirement for the IPDE systems to 
function earlier than orginally planned (DAMIR, 1998). Table 10 shows the cost variance 
against the 1997 baseline. 
 
Cost Measure (per unit) May 1997 APB Current Estimate 
Dec 1999 SAR 
Cost Per Unit 
PAUC 9018.6 9693.6 807.8 
APUC 8925.9 9596.0 799.667 
Table 10.   A Comparison of Cost Estimates in the Acquisition of the  
San Antonio-Class between 1997 and 1999 (after DAMIR, 1999b) 
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The greater-than-anticipated start-up cost for the IPPD and the IPDE continued in 
1999 as costs continued to grow. In addition to the earlier problems, there was also a lack 
of government-/vendor-funished information, insufficient resources, and less than 
anticipated performance resulting in a lack of progress in the program. At the request of 
the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development, and acquisition 
(ASN[RD&A]), there was a yard-wide review of Navy programs at Avondale. One of the 
results of this review was for Avondale to propose a 10-month delay in the delivery of the 
USS San Antonio and a delay of less than six months for the USS New Orleans (LPD-
18). The delivery date was extended to September 2003, a slip of 10 months that resulted 
in a breach in the APB. The PM estimated the price at completion to be $871.8 million 
(DAMIR, 1999c). 
a. Continuing Delays 
Construction of the lead ship began in August 2000, and after cost and schedule 
performance was analyzed, it was realized that a further schedule modification would be 
required. An independent schedule assessment was conducted, and as a result, an 
additional 14 months was required to complete the lead ship. The schedule delay was 
found to be the result of the limited ability of the prime contractor to deal with increasing 
design complexity and integration. On November 14, 2001, the secretary of the Navy 
notified Congress that the PAUC and APUC exceeded the APB by more than 25% and 
was a Nunn–McCurdy breach (DAMIR, 2001). Table 11 shows these cost increases in 
the current estimate against the 1997 baseline. 
 
Cost Measure (per unit) May 1997 APB Current Estimate 
Dec 2001 SAR 
Cost Per Unit  
PAUC 9018.6 12939.5 1078.292 
APUC 8925.9 12842.4 1070.200 
Table 11.   A Comparison of Cost Estimates in the Acquisition of the  
San Antonio-Class between 1997 and 2001 (after DAMIR, 2001) 
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The two-year schedule delay and profile adjustments resulted in an increase of 
$1.3 billion in program costs and was the primary reason for the FY2001 and FY2002 
hiatus in San Antonio-class procurement (O’Rourke, 2011). Unit APUC increased 
significantly when the program costs were spread over eight ships instead of 12 when 
those later ships would have lower costs (DAMIR, 2001). Actions taken to control costs 
included the following: 
 changed contract to cost-plus incentive fee/award fee (CPIF/AF), 
 used contractor performance assessment reporting system (CPARS) as a 
measure of past performance, 
 incorporated FAR provision 52.248–1 to target cost reduction/cost 
avoidance (DAMIR, 2001). 
Table 12 shows the 2002 rebaseline with the current estimate as compared to the 1997 
baseline. 
Cost Measure (per unit) May 1997 APB Jun 2002 APB Current Estimate 
Dec 2002 SAR 
Cost Per Unit  
PAUC 9018.6 12939.5 13399.6 1116.633 
APUC 8925.9 12842.4 13299.2 1108.267 
Table 12.   A Comparison of Cost Estimates in the Acquisition of the  
San Antonio-Class between 1997 and 2002 (after DAMIR, 2002) 
A major decision made in 2002 to reduce cost was to sign a workload swap 
agreement between Navy, Bath Iron Works, and Northrop Grumman Ship Systems 
(NGSS), consolidating construction within the NGSS Gulf Coast facilities (DAMIR, 
2002). Table 13 shows the 2003 estimate against the 1996 baseline.  
 
Cost Measure (per 
unit) 
May 1997 APB Jun 2002 APB Current Estimate 
Dec 2003 SAR 
Cost Per Unit  
PAUC 9018.6 12939.5 10304.9 1144.989 
APUC 8925.9 12842.4 10192.1 1132.456 
Table 13.   A Comparison of Cost Estimates in the Acquisition of the  
San Antonio-Class between 1997 and 2003 (after DAMIR, 2003) 
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b. Reduction in Build Quantity 
The FY2006 president’s budget reduced the total quantity of requested ships from 
12 to nine. This caused a reduction in the PAUC and APUC from the December 2002 
numbers, but on a per-unit basis the cost still increased (DAMIR, 2005). The hulls that 
were being built at this time were experiencing cost growth at the contractor’s facility. 
The causes of this are covered in the following section on cost growth. 
3. Initial Ship Delivery  
The USS San Antonio was delivered to the Navy following the Navy’s Board of 
Inspections and Survey recommendation on July 20, 2005. The following month, 
Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast area. One major impact of this event was to the 
workforce dedicated for the San Antonio-class ship construction, which negativly 
affected program costs and schedules. In accordance with the FY2006 National Defense 
Authorization Act, the baseline was updated to the current UCR baseline because the unit 
costs exceeded 50% (DAMIR, 2005). Table 14 shows the 2005 estimate against the 1996 
baseline.  
 
Cost Measure (per unit) May 1997 APB Oct 2005 APB Current Estimate 
Dec 2005 SAR 
Cost Per Unit  
PAUC 9018.6 12955.2 10411.6 1156.844 
APUC 8925.9 12842.4 10299.9 1144.433 
Table 14.   A Comparison of Cost Estimates in the Acquisition of the  
San Antonio-Class between 1997 and 2005 (after DAMIR, 2005) 
This makes the October 2005 UCR baseline for the PAUC and APUC both at the 
12-unit quantity while the current estimate was at nine ships. The current estimate in total 
was less than the October 2005 rebaseline; however, on a per-unit basis, the current 
estimate was greater than the baseline (DAMIR, 2005). Table 15 shows the 2006 estimate 
against the 1996 baseline. 
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Cost Measure (per unit) May 1997 APB Oct 2005 APB Current Estimate 
Dec 2006 SAR 
Cost Per Unit  
PAUC 9018.6 12955.2 11103.4 1233.711 
APUC 8925.9 12842.4 10992.1 1221.344 
Table 15.   A Comparison of Cost Estimates in the Acquisition of the  
San Antonio-Class between 1997, 2005 and 2006 (after DAMIR, 2006) 
In 2006, the San Antonio-class program utilzed supplemental funding provided to 
programs that were affected by Hurricane Katrina. The program was 14% above the 
PAUC and APUC baseline. Of this 14% increase over the baseline, 4% was attributed to 
the reduction of three ships and 8% attributed to the affects of Hurricane Katrina 
(DAMIR, 2006). Table 16 shows the 2010 estimate against the 1996 baseline. 
Cost Measure (per 
unit) 
May 1997 APB Dec 2010 APB Current Estimate 
Dec 2007 SAR 
Cost Per Unit  
PAUC 9018.6 14458.4 14379.2 1307.2 
APUC 8925.9 14347.1 14263.1 1296.645 
Table 16.   A Comparison of Cost Estimates in the Acquisition of the  
San Antonio-Class between 1997, 2007 and 2010 (after DAMIR, 2010) 
By the end of 2010, five of the currently planned 11 ships had been delivered. The 
first three ships were delivered with significant deficiencies. These deficiencies have 
been reduced as additional hulls have been delivered. The turning point for the San 
Antonio-class program was the USS San Diego (LPD-22), which saw no starred 
deficiencies at delivery; however, it still had over 3,300 deficiencies that the contractor 
was resposible for. A starred deficiency is a Part I deficiency that the inspectors from 
INSURV (the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey) label as most severe which 
degrade the ship’s ability to perform a primary or secondary operational capability or 
impede the crew’s ability to safely operate and maintain the ship or its systems. 
Accepting ships with deficiencies is not unique to the San Antonio-class program. The 
Navy’s goal in accepting ships with deficiencies is that they will be corrected within the 
first four months. Some of these deficiencies were not corrected within that time frame, 
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and there have been cases in which operations and maintenance funds were used to 
correct the problems, increasing hull costs in the sustainment period (GAO, 2013). 
Redesign was required when engine reliability issues were discovered to be caused by 
lube oil cleaniness problems. LPDs 17–21 were affected by this design problem and 
required rework. The new design will be incorporated into LPD-22 and subsequent hulls, 
eliminating this cost from these later hulls (DAMIR, 2010b). Table 17 shows the cost 









   PAUC  APUC  QTY  PAUC  APUC  PAUC  APUC 
May‐97   $751.55    $743.83  12            
Dec‐97   $729.16    $720.82  12  $(22.39)  $(23.01) ‐3%  ‐3%
Dec‐98   $727.70    $719.49  12  $(1.46)  $(1.33) ‐3%  ‐3%
Dec‐99   $807.80    $799.67  12  $80.10   $80.18   7%  8%
May‐00   $751.55    $743.83  12  $(56.25)  $(55.84)      
Dec‐00  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Dec‐01   $1,078.29    $1,070.20  12  $326.74   $326.38   43%  44%
Jun‐02   $1,078.29    $1,070.20  12  $‐   $‐        
Dec‐02   $1,116.63    $1,108.27  12  $38.34   $38.07   4%  4%
Dec‐03   $1,098.68    $1,090.23  12  $(17.95)  $(18.03) 2%  2%
Dec‐04   $1,144.99    $1,132.46  9  $46.31   $42.22   6%  6%
Oct‐05   $1,079.60    $1,070.20  12  $(65.39)  $(62.26)      
Dec‐05   $1,156.84    $1,144.43  9  $77.24   $74.23   7%  7%
Dec‐06   $1,233.71    $1,221.34  9  $76.87   $76.91   14%  14%
Dec‐07   $1,278.67    $1,265.77  9  $44.96   $44.42   18%  18%
Dec‐08  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Dec‐09  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Dec‐10   $1,314.40    $1,304.28  11  $35.73   $38.51        
Dec‐10   $1,307.20    $1,296.65  11  $(7.20)  $(7.64) ‐1%  ‐1%
Dec‐11   $1,297.21    $1,286.66  11  $(9.99)  $(9.99) ‐1%  ‐1%
Dec‐12   $1,292.78    $1,282.23  11  $(4.43)  $(4.43) ‐2%  ‐2%
 
Table 17.   Cost Changes through the Acquisition of the San Antonio-Class  
(after DAMIR, 1997b, 1998, 1999b, 1999c, 2001, 2004, 2005,  
2006, 2007, 2010b, 2011b, 2012b)  
Note. Gray box indicates a baseline. 
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D. SAN ANTONIO-CLASS CONTRACT  
In December 1996, the USS San Antonio was contracted under a cost-plus-award-
fee contract for detail design, integration, and construction of the USS San Antonio to 
Avondale Industries. Included in this contract was the option for the construction of the 
USS New Orleans and USS Mesa Verde (LPD-19). Other major contractors that worked 
with Avondale were General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works, Hughes Aircraft Company, and 
Intergraph Corportation. The initial contract was for $641 million with various options 
that, if exercised, would bring the entire value of the contract to $1.526 million (DOD, 
1996). In 2001, as costs continued to increase, the contract was converted to a CPIF/AF 
to tie profit to control of costs (DAMIR, 2001). Avondale’s corporate structure has 
changed from the initial contract date through various shipbuilding company aquistions 
and consolidations. San Antonio-class is currently being constructed by Huntington 
Ingalls Industries, which absorbed Avondale (Shipbuilding History, 2014). 
E. ACQUISITION SOURCES OF COST GROWTH 
The San Antonio-class program saw considerable cost growth in the first two 
ships with the follow-on ships having significantly less cost growth. This is not surprising 
of a major acquisition program because the learning and design issues are resolved in 
early hulls. Many of the early hulls had cost growth in the same areas. The GAO (2005) 
discussed the issues of cost growth for the early ships in the San Antonio-class program 
in its report Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management Practices Could Help 
Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding. The report broke down the cost of building 
a ship into four components: labor, material, overhead, and Navy-furnished equipment. 
The main drivers for the cost growth on the USS San Antonio and USS New Orleans 
were increases in the labor hours and material costs, approximately 76% of the total cost 
growth combined; the remaining cost growth was due to increases in overhead and labor 
rates and, to a small extent, Navy furnished equipment (GAO, 2005). A summary of the 
cost growth by amount and percentage of total cost growth is provided in Table 18. 
 
78 
Table 18.    Cost Grown in USS San Antonio and USS New Orleans  
(after GAO, 2005) 
1. Material Costs Increases 
The USS San Antonio saw a $400 million material cost growth while the USS 
New Orleans saw a $93 milllion growth. One of the major material cost growth drivers 
was engineering costs. During the design phase of the San Antonio-class program, a new 
three-dimensional (3D) product model tool was used in the design process. The 3D 
product model tool was not fully developled while it was being used on the San Antonio-
class program and led to problems that affected the entire design. The San Antonio-class 
program realized a $215 million growth in engineering cost in order to correct these 
design problems (GAO, 2005).  
2. Labor Hours 
Total cost growth due to increased labor hours was $284 million for the USS San 
Antonio and $184 million for the USS New Orleans. Problems with the design process 
and engineering personnel churn resulted in an unstable desgin. The unstable design led 
to work being delayed from the building cycle to the integration of the hull. Shifting the 
work from the building cycle to the integration cycle led to higher costs than were 
originally planned. This delay caused 1.3 million labor hours to be moved from the 












3. Overhead and Labor Rates 
Overhead and labor rates increased causing a cost growth of $175 million for the 
USS San Antonio and $110 million for the USS New Orleans. The growth in overhead 
for the shipbuilder was due to changing factory workload and economic impacts. The 
shipbuilder distributes its overhead to all the planned projects that would be completed 
when the San Antonio-class ships were being constructed. The loss of an auxiliary cargo 
(K) and ammunition (E) ship (T-AKE), a commercial ship, and a delay in the signing of 
the contact for the next generation destroyer caused the overhead that would have been 
applied to these programs to be applied to the remaining. Other factors that impacted the 
overhead rate were the rise in pension funds and medical care costs. Labor rates increased 
due to the two-year delay in the program and increased wage rates and inflation (GAO, 
2005).  
The hulls constructed after USS New Orleans saw cost growth but in a smaller 
amount than the first two hulls. Some of the common causes of cost growth that affected 
the hulls after USS San Antonio and USS New Orleans were as follows: 
 loss of skilled labor; 
 increased overhead cause by the Pension Protection Act and increased 
property insurance premiums following Hurricane Katrina; and 
 increased direct labor rates due to the 2007 collective bargaining 
agreement (GAO, 2005). 
F. COST REDUCTION 
Although the San Antonio-class experienced significant cost growth early in the 
program’s life, it can now build ships at a firm price with little cost growth. As the needs 
of the amphibious force changes, building ships with an already established production 
line can prevent unexpected cost growth. In the budget deal to fund the DOD, Congress 
included funding for an additional San Antonio-class ship that the Navy did not request 
(GAO, 2005).  
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1. Senate Concerns  
Senate Report 112–196 highlighted the Committee on Appropriations’ concerns 
and the reasons behind their decision to add funds for pre-construction on another San 
Antonio-class vessel: 
 The planned 33 amphibious fleet could not meet the 38 amphibious fleet 
requirements. By 2015, the total amphibious fleet will total 28 ships based 
on the construction and retirement plans. As the DOD aligns to refocus to 
the Asia-Pacific region, the Committee on Appropriations views the risk 
of not having these assets available as being too high.  
 There will be a five-year gap in amphibious shipbuilding when the San 
Antonio-class planned 11-ship line is completed. If there is a funding gap, 
it will negatively impact the industrial base leading to additional cost 
growth in multiple shipbuilding programs.  
The Committee on Appropriations added an additional $263.255 million only for 
advance procurement of another San Antonio-class vessel (Inouye, 2012). 
2. Dock Landing Ship (Experimental)  
The next ship in the amphibious fleet that would need to be replaced is the 
Whidbey Island-class (LSD-41). Hunting Ingalls (currently building the USS Portland 
[LPD-27]) is suggesting using the San Antonio-class design (LPD-17 Flight II). There are 
benefits to using the San Antonio-class design as the basis for the experimental version of 
the next dock landing ship (LSD): 
 The design cost is reduced by not having to create an all new design. 
 Construction costs are reduced by capitalizing on the learning curves of 
the San Antonio-class. 
 Funding for the 12th San Antonio-class has already been appropriated, and 
building the 12th ship and keeping the line open until the LSD(X) begins 
reducing the production gap between the two programs improves the 




It may be too early to know whether the San Antonio-class design would be a 
good basis for the LSD(X) because the requirements are not fully determined. Some 
skeptics noted that the Navy may lose some new technology by using a San Antonio-
class design because a completely new design could more fully incorporate the 
technological advances from the years since the San Antonio-class was designed, to 
include technology focused on crew size reduction that would reduce the total life-cycle 





















V. OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT VIRGINIA CLASS 
This chapter highlights the savings that the Navy seeks in the Virginia-class. It 
provides a qualitative analysis of tools used in the O&S phase of the Virginia-class 
submarine program. At the time of this project, the Virginia-class had not yet completed 
low rate initial production (LRIP), which will be comprised of SSN 774 through SSN 
787; this represents 47% of the total inventory, a typical variation for ships from the 
acquisition standard of 10%. Even though the Virginia-class has incurred only a fraction 
of the planned O&S costs, this does not preclude analysis of the projected or simulated 
O&S costs with the limited historical data available. 
A. SIGNIFICANT COST SAVINGS IS PARAMOUNT 
The Navy continues to seek significantly lower TOC for Virginia-class by the 
program RTOC. RTOC aims to significantly reduce the costs during the O&S phase of 
the system’s life cycle throughout major DOD acquisition programs. A major cost driver 
of TOC are shipyard maintenance availability periods, which are costly both in terms of 
maintenance dollars, as well as the removal of a submarine from service. 
1. Reduced Total Ownership Costs 
RTOC efforts in the DOD date prior to 1997.  These studies that launched the 
RTOC initiatives highlighted the increasing cost of programs, notably during the O&S 
phase of the acquisition life cycle. RTOC categorized cost solutions into three elements: 
 increasing the visibility and priority of the problem, 
 changing the behavior of organizations and individuals, and 
 institutionalizing the RTOC process (Mandelbaum & Pallas, 2001). 
Reducing cost growth has become a major priority in the Navy. An example of 
the seriousness of the problem of increasing costs over time is evident in the age of ship 
disposal: In 1999, ships were disposed after 22 years of service, and at present, this 
occurs after 30 to 37 years. As ships remain in service longer, the cost of sustainment in 
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comparison to acquisition costs increases, and overall program cost increases as well 
(Mandelbaum & Pallas, 2001). 
The Navy implemented RTOC through the Navy Cost Reduction Effectiveness 
Improvement (CREI) program. CREI sought to improve vertical communication when 
considering ways to reduce costs and improve effectiveness. In Reducing Total 
Ownership Costs in the DOD, Mandelbaum and Pallas (2001) said the following when 
describing the CREI process: 
The Navy CREI process was formulated to ensure ideas that reduce costs, reduce 
workload, improve quality of life, and improve readiness are appropriately vetted, 
funded, and implemented. These ideas are compared and balanced against other 
priorities during the Navy budgeting process. (p. 79) 
2. Increasing Total Ownership Cost Effectiveness  
A key indicator of RTOC success is an increase in TOC effectiveness. Reducing 
the number of costly dry-dock maintenance periods the submarine is scheduled to 
undergo in the targeted 33 years of service increases TOC effectiveness. The demand for 
dry-dock periods is driven by required maintenance actions to the submarine at 
subsystem or component levels. RTOC does not seek to reduce the dry-dock periods by 
making a unilateral change; rather, it takes a holistic approach. Subsystems and 
components are engineered to require fewer actions by depot-level technicians, and fewer 
maintenance actions require the submarine to be dry docked (Goff et al., 2012). 
3. Thirty-three Years, 15 Deployments, 3 Dry-Dock Periods, 1 Depot-
Maintenance Period 
RTOC considered the following: a submarine life of 33 years, 15 deployments, 
three dry-dock periods, and one depot-maintenance period for Block IV submarines, 
starting with SSN 792. Blocks I through III will likely complete 13 or 14 deployments. 
The service life of 33 years is nearly the same as previous classes but is directly tied to 
the Navy’s requirement for attack submarine end strength. A submarine’s failure to meet 
its required service life results in a reduction of available assets prior to the acquisition of 
a replacement submarine. The deployment number is intrinsically related to the number 
of hulls available for tasking, in service and not in dry dock. The dry-dock period is a 
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product of deployments based on modeling. All three of these metrics or requirements 
must be considered simultaneously at some point if even one is analyzed for possible cost 
savings in RTOC (DAMIR, 2012a; Goff et al., 2012).  
4. Use of Simulation to Determine Costs 
Nearly all of the projected life-cycle costs of the Virginia-class program rely on 
simulation to achieve targeted and perceived savings. Because the submarine is still very 
new when viewed in O&S terms, the program office has yet to evaluate the full impact of 
a reduction in dry-dock periods on the submarine’s performance; simulation was and 
continues to be used.  
5. Similar Systems Used in Estimation and Simulation  
The O&S estimates used for the Virginia-class submarines are comprised of 
several contributing costs relating to the sustainment period of a submarine’s life cycle. 
The estimate includes costs for unit-level manpower, unit operations, maintenance, 
sustaining support, continuing system improvements, and indirect support (DAMIR, 
2012a). 
B. SOURCES OF DATA FOR ESTIMATION 
The source data used to develop estimates through modeling were attained from 
several sources. In the interest of efficiency, the following sections rely on the previous 
work of the DAMIR in its 2012(a) Virginia-class SAR (see p. 43). In order to fully 
understand this excerpt from the 2012 SAR, the following definition is provided: The 
classified cost analysis requirements description (CARD) describes in detail an 
acquisition program and the system or platform itself. 
The following is an excerpt from the 2012 SAR (DAMIR, 2012a): 
Manpower 
Manpower was estimated based on the crew description contained in the 
Manning Estimate Report (MER) (15 officers, 120 enlisted), and the direct 




Unit Operations was based on historical Los Angeles-class data and 
factored by power, weight, and crew size.  
Maintenance  
Maintenance was estimated based on historical Los Angeles-class 
maintenance costs factored for the Virginia-class based on weight. Public 
and private shipyard data was used, as well as the maintenance schedule 
provided in the CARD to appropriately phase maintenance costs over the 
service life of the submarines. 
Sustaining Support 
Sustaining Support was estimated based on historical Los Angeles-class 
data factored by weight or crew size, depending on the individual element. 
Continuing System Improvements  
Continuous system improvements were estimated based on historical Los 
Angeles-class data factored by weight.  
Software Maintenance  
Software maintenance was based on the analysis of Arleigh Burke-class 
with costs estimated per line of code and factored by the total Source 
Lines of Code count contained in the CARD.  
Indirect Support  
Indirect Support was based on historical infrastructure costs from U.S. 
Naval Submarine Bases, as well as historical personnel costs from Los 
Angeles-class, which were factored for the Virginia-class crew size.  
(p. 43) 
C. OPERATION AND SUPPORT COST COMPARISON 
This section provides a comparison between the Virginia-class, Los Angeles-
class, and Seawolf-class O&S costs. Typically, comparisons are made between Virginia-
class simulated cost data and Los Angeles-class data, which are comprised mostly of 
estimates based on previous costs incurred in the class. Typically, cost comparisons are 
limited to these two platforms because they are similar in many ways, and much of the 
Virginia-class O&S cost estimation modeling is based on the Los Angeles-class. This 
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comparison includes the Seawolf-class because it provides an example of cost savings 
and cost growth, which may provide tools for future programs. 
1. Seawolf-Class Operation and Support Costs 
Seawolf-class was originally planned to be a class of 30 submarines; the number 
was later reduced to 12, and eventually procurement was halted after the third submarine, 
the USS Jimmy Carter (SSN 23), which was commissioned in February 2005. Despite 
the reduced number of submarines procured, the value of a comparison should not be 
overlooked. 
Each submarine in the Seawolf-class is projected to have a 30-year service life, 
displace 9,150 tons, consist of a 134-person crew, and require an estimated two overhauls 
and six SRAs throughout each hull’s service life. The scheduled time between 
availabilities is projected to be 42 months (DAMIR, 1997a, 1999a). 
The projected annual O&S cost for each Seawolf-class submarine is  
$48.97 (expressed in millions, 1995 dollars). ICEs are as follows (expressed in millions, 
1995 dollars): 
 mission pay and allowance, $6.5 
 unit-level consumption, $4.1 
 intermediate maintenance, $3.6 
 depot maintenance, $13.41 
 contractor support, $1.4 
 sustaining support, $14.9 
 indirect, $5.8 (DAMIR, 1999a)  
Seawolf-class sustainment costs on average were comparatively low in the early 
years of the program, from 1998 to 2003. As the years of operation progressed, from 
2004 to 2012, costs continued to grow. Although this data may not represent future costs, 
the Seawolf-class sustainment costs, on average, appear to be unsupportable in a fiscally 
constrained environment. Figure 11 itemizes Seawolf-class’s actual O&S costs.  
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Figure 11.   Seawolf-Class Historical Sustainment Costs (after VAMOSC, 2013) 
2. Los Angeles-Class Operation and Support Costs 
The USS Los Angeles was commissioned in 1976; later model builds are expected 
to remain in service until 2029. The Navy built 62 vessels in this class but later 
decommissioned 21 instead of performing mid-life nuclear refueling (DAMIR, 2012a). 
Each submarine in the Los Angeles-class that completed required mid-life nuclear 
refueling displaces 6,082 tons surfaced, has a crew of 132, and is projected to have a 30-
year service life, during which the submarine would undergo four dry-dock periods; one 
depot-maintenance period; and one engineering overhaul, which includes a nuclear 
refueling. Recently, the class extended the life cycle by three years, resulting in a total of 
33 years of service life for several of the submarines (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2010). 
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The most current projected O&S costs for each Los Angeles-class submarine 
were referenced in the 2012 SAR (DAMIR, 2012a) and total $30.52 million (1995 
dollars). Individual elements are as follows (expressed in millions, 1995 dollars): 
  unit-level manpower, $5.45  
 unit operations, $.74 
 maintenance, $.70 
 sustaining support, $.99 
  continuing systems improvements, $4.24 
  indirect support, $4.11 
 and other, $0 
Despite the long history of Los Angeles-class submarines in service, the 
availability of historic life-cycle O&S cost data is not robust due to the early 
decommissioning of 21 submarines. 
 
Figure 12.  Los Angeles-Class Historical Sustainment Costs (after VAMOSC, 2013) 
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More than 10 years of sustainment cost data for the Los Angeles-class remains 
unavailable due to the fact that VAMOSC data collection began in 1984. Los Angeles-
class sustainment costs on average were consistent throughout the time period 
represented in Figure 12. This period represents the final two thirds of the service life of 
the class. Notably, 21 of 62 hulls were decommissioned at the refueling point of their 
nuclear reactor; since 2006, a slight decrease in sustainment costs has occurred as older 
Los Angeles-class submarines were decommissioned. The large number of submarines in 
this class, the comparatively larger percentage of useful life expended, and its operational 
effectiveness make this class a credible baseline to compare future affordability. 
3. Virginia-Class Operation and Support Costs 
The Navy plans to build 30 submarines with a service life of 33 years per hull, 
with a displacement of 7,800 tons. To date, eight submarines have been delivered to the 
Navy. The Virginia-class has a crew size of 134 and is projected to have three dry-dock 
periods and one depot-maintenance period in its 33-year life cycle. These seemingly 
disconnected facts all contribute to the O&S costs and their comparability to the O&S 
costs of other submarine classes. 
Virtually all of the O&S cost estimates that are provided for Virginia-class are 
estimates derived from modeling and simulation. Estimates were based on actual 
VAMSOC data from Los Angeles-class and Virginia-class and used to construct O&S 
cost estimates. On cases in which Virginia-class and Los Angeles-class differed (e.g., 
those maintenance actions that are sensitive to displacement differences), the Los 
Angeles-class historical data was used and adjusted to compensate for the differing 
weight between the two classes to achieve an estimate for Virginia-class. Similar 
computations were repeated to adjust for the differences between the two classes 
(DAMIR, 2012a). 
The projected O&S costs for each Virginia-class submarine are $35.4 million 
(1995 dollars). Individual elements are as follows (expressed in millions, 1995 dollars):  
 unit-level manpower, $8.98 
 unit operations, $0.74 
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 maintenance, $13.98  
 sustaining support, $.96 
 continuing systems improvements,$6.37  
 indirect support,$4.37 
 other, $0.  
Notably, the estimated O&S costs of Virginia-class exceed those of Los Angeles-
class. The higher manpower cost on Virginia-class is surprising, considering the smaller 
crew size. Additionally, the personnel costs in the Navy have outpaced inflation in the 
decades since Los Angeles-class was commissioned, resulting in a much higher cost 
estimate for Virginia-class.  Visual depiction of O&S cost can be seen in Figured 13. 
  
Figure 13.  Virginia-Class Historical Sustainment Costs (after VAMOSC, 2012) 
Virginia-class sustainment costs on average have not increased to the degree of 
the Seawolf-class and have remained lower than both Los Angeles-class and Seawolf-
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class. Although this data may not represent future costs, the Virginia-class sustainment 
costs, on average, appear to be more affordable in a fiscally constrained environment. 
Considering the emphasis that the Virginia-class placed on affordability for the 
sustainment period, even if the average cost per year to sustain a Virginia-class 
submarine increased by an additional $2 million per hull, the Virginia-class submarine 
will remain 20% more affordable than the Los Angeles-class and 50% more affordable 
than the Seawolf-class. Within the limits of the data available, the Virginia-class program 
appears to have successful in achieving greater affordability within the sustainment 
period of its life cycle. Table 19 itemizes actual O&S costs of Virginia-class. 
 
Cost Element VIRGINIA LOS ANGELES Cost Element SEAWOLF 
Unit-Level 
Manpower 
$8.98 $5.45 Mission Pay & 
Allowances 
$6.5 
Unit Operations $.74 $.70 Unit-Level 
Consumption 
$4.1 
Maintenance $13.98 $15.03 Intermediate 
Maintenance 
$3.6 
Sustaining Support $.96 $.99 Depot Maintenance $13.41 
Continuing System 
Improvements 
$6.37 $4.24 Contractor Support $1.4 
Indirect Support $4.37 $4.11 Sustaining Support $14.9 
----------------------   Indirect $5.8 
Other 0 0 Other 0 
Total $35.40 $30.52 Total $48.97 
Table 19.   Annual Submarine Operations and Sustainment Cost Comparison  
(after DAMIR, 2012a) 
Note. Expressed in millions, 1995 dollars. 
 
D. EARLY PLANNING FOR COST SAVINGS 
The Navy sought to control or cut costs in the sustainment phase on Virginia-class 
as well as the acquisition phase, which is covered in Section IIIB. The O&S costs 
typically account for 80% of a program’s cost. This section relies heavily on the previous 
work of the RAND Corporation and the National Defense Research Institute, in its report 
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titled Learning From Experience: Volume II: Lessons From the U.S. Navy’s Ohio, 
Seawolf, and Virginia Submarine Programs (Schank et al., 2011). 
1. Life Cycle 
Life-cycle costs of the Virginia-class were considered from the early planning 
stages. Planners met with stakeholders to find ways to reduce life-cycle costs through 
planning and analyzing the cost drivers of submarines through their 30+ years of service. 
Planners analyzed and studied the interaction between operators and maintainers in 
virtual mock-ups to validate human interfaces (Schank et al., 2011, p. 89). This 
collaboration validated concepts and procedural changes that the teams were considering. 
Electric Boat was contracted to provide advanced planning and design in support of 
overhauls and repair availabilities.  
Key relationships between design for manufacturing and design for repair must be 
considered when evaluating the life-cycle cost of a component or system. Additionally, 
the reliability of installed systems, expressed in mean time between failures (MTBF), and 
the life-years of all systems, must be considered when estimating life-cycle costs. The 
life-cycle planning process for the Virginia-class evaluated how knowledge of the 
preceding information could be used to change what a submarine would cost the Navy 
over a 30-year period. For example, if a system that normally required overhaul every 48 
months could be extended to 72 months through modification or redesign, what 
interdependent costs are associated with this change? What periodic maintenance costs 
are involved? These efforts are examples of focusing on the goal of controlling costs; 
designing for affordability furthered that goal beyond the acquisition phase and into the 
sustainment phase. 
2. Integrated Product Process Development 
Integrated product process development (IPPD) was a key contributor in 
designing the Virginia-class with the goal of reducing life-cycle costs. From early in the 
design process, traditional modes of interaction were replaced by a relationship in which 
the contractor stood on nearly equal terms with the customer and worked to reduce costs 
from the beginning the relationships were reset from traditional roles whereby the 
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contractor who now stood on nearly equal terms with the customer worked to reduce 
costs from the beginning. Reducing costs was, as previously described in Chapter VI, a 
requirement for survival of the program, not merely a slogan (Schank et al., 2007). 
In the Virginia-class’ development, the previous lock-step design process used on 
Los Angeles-class and previous classes was replaced with IPPD. Use of IPPD enabled the 
Navy and contractors to work toward the goal of reducing life-cycle costs. Cost 
reductions were sought through improving integrated design and production planning 
while ensuring that the life cycle of the platform was considered at every stage of 
development (Schank et al., 2007, p. 15). The use of IPPD allowed several steps to be 
performed in parallel, an efficiency improvement over the previous process (Schank et 
al., 2007). 
3. Acquisition Savings ≠ Sustainment Savings 
Goff et al. (2012) argued, “In some cases, changes to Virginia-class design from 
Los Angeles-class to save acquisition cost or improve performance caused increases in 
the cost and duration of planned maintenance” (p. 2). This tradeoff decision to lower 
acquisition cost in the short term versus lowering O&S cost was likely attributable to 
Congress’s pressure to keep acquisition costs lower. 
4. Design for Cost Reduction 
The projected savings for the Virginia-class can be attributed to its design for cost 
reduction. In Engineering the Solution, Johnson et al. (n.d.) provided the following:  
The second leg of the integrated cost reduction strategy was the design 
changes made for cost reduction. The shipbuilder and the Virginia-class 
Program Office examined every major cost driver area targeting systems, 
parts, and process involved in building Virginia-class submarines, looking 
for ways to modify the design in areas that would reduce overall cost and 
construction time. However, each design change was required to be 
“capability neutral,” meaning that it would take advantage of new 
technologies to provide equal levels of performance while concurrently 
reducing cost. (p. 12) 
This paragraph highlights the emphasis on savings throughout the life of the 
program but not at the cost of established capability.  
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VI. OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT SAN ANTONIO-CLASS 
A. OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT 
This chapter focuses on the O&S costs of the San Antonio-class. It provides a 
qualitative analysis on tools used and decisions made that will have projected impacts in 
the O&S phase of the San Antonio-class program. At the time of this project, the 
contractor had delivered eight of the 11 planned ships. (This does not include advance 
funding for a 12th ship because construction has not yet started.) There is limited actual 
O&S data due to the short time that the ships have been operational as compared to their 
40-year expected life spans. Most of the data in this report come from the early hulls 
because they reflect the most usage; however, these ships may not be an accurate 
representation of the costs for the entire program. As problems are discovered in the 
initial deliveries, they are redesigned in the follow-on hulls, reducing O&S costs.  
1. Integrated Product and Process Development Decisions  
One aspect of the IPPD tool was to focus on reducing total ownership costs early 
in the design process when incorporating these decisions required little redesign or 
rework. Some items that the IPPD processes identified as areas that can reduce RTOCs 
were as follows: 
 reduce manning;  
 change ship service diesel generator transient load requirement (increase 
mean time between overhauls); 
 change radar to SPS 73 versus 67/64 (less expensive to maintain and helps 
to reduce manning); 
 use titanium piping in sea water systems, which reduces corrosion and 
extends system life; 
 apply longer-lasting paint and corrosion inhibitors, which reduces 
maintenance man-hours; 
 employ self-cleaning filters on diesel engines, which reduces maintenance 
man-hours; 
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 use a 10 gallon per minute (GPM) oily water separator versus 50GPM to 
save space and weight, and reduce operating cost; and 
 use self-cleaning strainers in the machinery’s fresh water-cooling system, 
which reduces maintenance man-hours (Fireman et al., 1998). 
These decisions were made for the San Antonio-class program and may not be 
applicable to other programs due to the differing requirements; however, the tool that was 
used to develop these decisions (the IPPD process) can be applied to other programs and 
can lead to decisions that reduce TOC. 
2. Reduced Total Ownership Cost Pilot Program 
The IPPD process was not the only pilot program that the Navy used on the San 
Antonio-class. Although the IPPD process was used as a way to reduce acquisition and 
O&S costs, there were other programs that the San Antonio-class used to further this 
goal. The Navy identified the San Antonio-class as an RTOC pilot program for testing 
RTOC approaches. At the end of the pilot program, the Navy shared the results with the 
DOD acquisition community. The purpose of RTOC is to reduce O&S costs while 
maintaining or improving current readiness (Reed, 2003). The following are the general 
approaches that these pilot programs focused on and the specific initiatives that the San 
Antonio-class used for each area. 
Reliability and maintainability (R&M) improvements: 
 design O&S cost target, 
 design producibility and reduced O&S cost targets, 
 identify and replace high-cost and low-MTBF components, 
 develop metrics as an assessment tool, and 
 use COTS and non-developmental item (NDI) commercial buying 
practices. 
 
Reduction of supply chain response time and reduction of logistics footprint: 
 utilize built-in diagnostics, 
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 reduce depot-maintenance workload, and 
 develop integrated data environment. 
 
Competitive product support: 
 develop life-cycle support study/depot source of repair analysis and 
 use performance-based logistics. 
 
The sharing of lessons learned from other programs has also helped the LPD-17 
incorporate these cost reduction strategies into its program, such as the Advanced Food 
Service and Integrated Bridge System initiatives (Reed, 2003). 
The lessons learned from the San Antonio-class that can be applied to other 
programs that are focusing on an RTOC-conscious design are as follows: 
 identify cost drivers,  
 identify a realistic stretch goal, 
 create a TOC-conscious environment, 
 create a TOC avoidance plan and process, 
 balance O&S cost avoidance/savings and design production cost 
incentives, 
 create a government–industry team, and 
 validate design changes with warfighter (Reed, 2003). 
a. Goals of Reduced Total Ownership Cost 
It was important that both the program management team and the contractor were 
focused on RTOC during the design process. The San Antonio-class program identified 
four objectives in ensuring that both teams were aligned with RTOC: 
 implement a RTOC process, 
 identify the TOC drivers, 
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 set cost objectives and targets that are both realistic and aggressive, and 
 focus on the end user (Litton Avondale Alliance, 2000). 
The PM has established the RTOC goal for the program to be a 20% reduction of 
the O&S cost from the program life-cycle cost estimate. It was important to the program 
to establish a baseline so that decision-makers had a point of reference on which to base 
their RTOC decisions. This baseline allowed the program to identify TOC drivers and 
highlight areas that the team could focus on to get the most cost reduction (Litton 
Avondale Alliance, 2000). 
 The RTOC pilot program was an enabler that was used to identify design 
decisions that could lead to RTOC. Some of the decisions that came from the focus on 
RTOC are listed and may not apply to every program. That, however, does not mean that 
the enabler cannot be used on other programs. 
B. DESIGN FOR REDUCED OPERATION AND SUPPORT 
The acquisition thinking that was prevalent in the San Antonio-class program was 
to design the ship from the start with the focus of reducing O&S costs. The program 
could realize cost savings if it incorporated technology and strategies to reduce cost early 
in the design process. The San Antonio-class program office identified 10 items that they 
could see would provide the largest O&S cost avoidance: 
 manning reduction, 
 advanced enclosed mast sensor 
 total ship training system, 
 coatings, 
 corrosion control, 
 ship’s service diesel generator, 
 asynchronous transfer mode switch, 
 Stratica deck tiles, 
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 medium Vs high pressure air system, and 
 synthetic decking (Reed, 2003). 
Incorporating commercial products and processes could reduce acquisition costs 
as well as O&S costs. By designing the ship to use these products and processes, the 
program could reduce the requirement for specially configured pieces of equipment that 
perform the same function as commercial items. Some examples of the commercial 
equipment that the San Antonio-class used were as follows: 
 food preparation equipment, 
 tank level indicator, 
 multi-jack fastener, 
 remote monitoring TV cameras, 
 smart card, 
 surge suppressors, and 
 Golar 500 incinerator (Reed, 2003). 
 
1. Reducing Deficiencies 
Recently, many U.S. shipbuilding programs have been accepting ships with a 
significant number of deficiencies. The need to maintain the program’s schedule timeline 
or to prevent a delay at key milestones have led the program to accept ships with 
deficiencies for correction later. These deficiencies can increase costs at the O&S stage of 
the program. USS San Antonio through USS New York (LPD-21) saw problems that were 
transferred to the fleet requiring O&M funds to correct the defects (GAO, 2013).  
The Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) teams conduct one of the 
inspections that a ship must go through before it is accepted into the Navy. During these 




These deficiencies are quality problems with the ship that are not in compliance with 
Navy standards or do not meet contract specifications. It can be difficult to determine 
who is responsible for correcting a deficiency. The program office, supervisor of 
shipbuilding, conversion, & repair (SUPSHIP) and the contractor determine who has the 
responsibility for correcting it. There can be many reasons that the government would be 
responsible for correcting the deficiency, but typically the deficiencies for which the 
government is responsible are ones that require a change to the ship design, a change in 
the ship specification, or a change in equipment that the government is responsible for 
providing. Deficiencies that do not fall into these categories are the responsibility of the 
contractor to correct and are primarily manufacturing defects (GAO, 2013). 
USS San Antonio through USS New York were delivered with significant 
deficiencies, the majority of which were the contractor’s responsibility. In 2009, the 
government initiated the Back-to-Basics Quality Improvement Initiative, which helped 
reduce the number of deficiencies that were found in delivered LPDs. USS San Diego 
saw an approximately 50% reduction in open non-starred deficiencies, as compared to the 
USS San Antonio (GAO, 2013). 
C.  ESTIMATED OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS 
In the beginning, the San Antonio-class program determined the anticipated O&S 
cost by using comparative actual costs and parametric measurements, which the cost 
analysis improvement group (CAIG) found to be realistic (“Parametric Cost,” 2011). 
Table 20 shows the breakdown of the estimated O&S cost as listed in the 1997 SAR 
(DAMIR, 1997a). The primary source of the data was the VAMOSC database. The 
program office used the LSD-41 actual cost data and adjusted those numbers to take into 


















Table 20.   Operation and Support Cost Estimate per Hull  
(after DAMIR, 1997b) 
As the program progressed, the O&S estimates were updated to reflect changes 
and decisions that had occurred that would affect O&S costs. In 2001, the program 
continued to use Whidbey Island-class VAMOSC data to develop estimates. The 
Whidbey Island-class data was modified to account for the differences in the two ships, 
such as crew size and fuel consumption (DAMIR, 2001). Table 21 shows the O&S 














Table 21.   Operation and Support Cost Estimate per Hull  
(after DAMIR, 2001) 
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There was a significant decrease in projected O&S costs from 2001 to 2007. The 
areas that saw decreases were in mission pay and allowances (now referred to as unit-
level manpower and depot maintenance). Table 22 shows a comparison in the O&S cost 
estimate from 1996 to 2007, as well as the areas that showed the cost decreases. The 
changes in depot maintenance were made to reflect current maintenance availabilities and 
man days. The changes in the unit-level manpower was updated based on data from the 













Table 22.   Estimated Operation and Support Costs per Hull  
(after DAMIR, 1997b; 2007) 
2010 showed an increase in the cost per hull totaling $43.5 million. The increases 
were in manpower costs, maintenance, and other (DAMIR, 2010b).  Unitized O&S costs 



















Table 23.   Operation and Support Cost Estimate per Hull  
(after DAMIR, 2010b) 
Data from the VAMOSC website showed an increase in maintenance cost starting 
in 2010 from the hulls that have been in service the longest. Figure 14 shows the 
maintenance cost of the 17th hull through the 22nd hull from 2006 to 2012. 
 
Figure 14.  Maintenance Costs per Hull (after VAMOSC, 2013) 
In 2012, eight ships had been delivered to the Navy. The O&S estimates were 
updated using data from the VAMOSC data based on the Austin-class ship, normalized 
on a 40-year life expectancy and using the expected production quantity of 11 hulls 
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(DAMIR, 2012b). The program office decided to use the Austin-class as the antecedent 
program, as opposed to the Whidbey Island-class that they were using before, because 
Austin-class is the ship class that is most similar in configuration to the San Antonio-












Table 24.   Estimated Operation and Support Cost per hull (after DAMIR, 2012b) 
The total O&S cost per hull for the San Antonio-class was slightly larger than the 
cost per hull for the Austin-class, which was $36.4 million (DAMIR, 2012b).  
D. ACTUAL COST DATA 
Using data that was gathered from the VAMOSC website, the actual cost to date 
can be compared to the program’s estimated cost per hull. Because the San Antonio-class 
is a relatively new program, there is limited actual O&S data available.  
Selected Elements number 1 through 4 (direct unit cost, maintenance and 
modernization–depot, maintenance–intermediate, and other operating and support), 
captured as much O&S cost as possible. Element number 1 sums the cost of the sub 
elements of personnel, unit-level consumption, and purchased services. Element number 
2 is the sum of the sub elements for labor and material for intermediate maintenance and 
commercial industrial services. Element number 3, maintenance modernization–depot, is 
the sum of the following: 
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 scheduled depot maintenance, 
 non-scheduled depot maintenance, 
 fleet modernization, 
 aircraft launch and recovery equipment (ALRE), 
 field change installation, 
 equipment rework, 
 design services allocation, and 
 other depot, which consist of “other depot maintenance costs not covered 
above, including scheduled and non-scheduled repairs to fleet ballistic 
missile systems” (IBM, 2013). 
Element number 4 is the sum of sub-elements for training, publications, 
engineering, and technical service and ammunition handling.  
To capture all available O&S data years 1984 (earliest year available) to 2013, all 
hulls that had VAMOSC data, USS San Antonio through USS Arlington (LPD-24), were 
selected. The cost values from VAMOSC were in constant 2013 dollars. These values 
were converted to 1996 dollars to match the base dollars used in the San Antonio-class 
SARs. The Joint Inflation Calculator, dated February 2013, provided by the Naval  
Center for Cost Analysis, was used to convert the values from the VAMOSC site to  
the same year dollars in the SARs. Selecting Operations and Maintenance, Navy 
(O&MN)(composite), setting the input year to 2013, and setting the target year to 1996 
ensured that the most accurate inflation factor was used for normalizing the data. These 
settings resulted in an inflation factor of .6105, which was then applied to the data from 
VAMOSC. 
The program office estimated in 2012 that the annual average cost per hull would 
be $38.6 million in BY$1996. The data from VAMOSC shows the average cost per hull 
from 2006 to 2012 when each new hull was turned over to the Navy (see Figure 15). 
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Figure 15.  Average Total Sustainment Costs per Hull (after VAMOSC, 2013) 
The average total sustainment cost per hull is trending up; however, the data 
available are on the first hull numbers in the program and may not be an accurate starting 
point to make estimations on future costs. The average cost per hull has generally stayed 
below the O&S estimate provided in the program’s SAR. Because it is early in the O&S 
stage, it is difficult to know the future trend of the cost data.  
The O&S costs from the San Antonio-class have been less than the costs from the 
Austin-class. Using O&S cost data from the VAMOSC database and averaging the costs 
over the number of hulls shows that the current average O&S costs per hull for the San 
Antonio-class have been less than the O&S costs per hull of the Austin-class. Figure 16 
shows the O&S cost of the Austin-class ship and the San Antonio-class. These dollar 
values are in constant BY1996 $, and the San Antonio-class shows a slightly lower cost 
than the Austin-class ship. The earliest data available on VAMOSC was from 1984.  
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Figure 16.  Operation and Support Cost Comparison per Hull between the Austin-Class 
and San Antonio-Class Ships (after VAMOSC, 2013) 
It is too early to make a definite judgment on whether the actual costs in O&S are 
the same as the estimated costs. If the program office was including O&S cost-saving 
measures in their estimates, then because the actual costs are below their estimates, it 
appears they have been saving costs in the O&S period. Table 25 shows the estimated 










Table 25.   SAR Operation and Support Comparison to Actual Operation and  
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VII. METHODOLOGY 
Research and analysis of the Virginia-class submarine and San Antonio-class 
amphibious transport enablers and decisions in conjunction with affordability outcomes 
was approached under a multiple–case-study design. The goal is to isolate those enabling 
circumstances and management tools and those programmatic decisions that appear to 
increase the likelihood of greater or lesser degrees of affordability. Under Ernest Boyer’s 
(1990) model of scholarship (Boyer, 1990), this study expands the body of knowledge for 
DOD acquisition through the scholarship of integration, by synthesizing information 
across two topical areas (ship and submarine vessel types) and across time (acquisition 
and sustainment periods; see Figure 17). The exploratory nature of this study lends itself 
to a qualitative research and analysis approach. 
 
Figure 17.  Depiction of this Study’s Scholarship of Integration, Conceptual 
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A. EXPLORATION AND COMPARISON 
Rather than testing a specific hypothesis, this study uses the previous literature on 
qualitative research design to develop a set of findings from a detailed exploration and 
comparison of the Virginia-class submarine and San Antonio-class amphibious transport 
programs. These programs are comparatively evaluated with regard to affordability. 
Although affordability is be addressed consistently across vessel types, across time the 
definition of affordability differs: 
 Affordability in the pre-acquisition period is defined by both the effects on 
the risk of cost growth as well as resultant cost growth.  
 Affordability in the acquisition period is defined by Sailaway, APUC, and 
PAUC target costs, as these targets are an extension of congressional 
mandates.  
 Affordability in the operations and support period is defined by the costs 
comparisons with the previous platforms these programs were mandated 
to replace, as no direct or indirect baseline (target) for sustainment has 
been legislatively mandated.  
By exploring how the enabling circumstances and management tools found in 
each program and the emerging programmatic decisions led to the resulting levels of 
affordability achieved in acquisition and sustainment, this study aims to find consistent 
factors or patterns which appear to markedly affect affordability and would benefit from 
more detailed studies.  
B. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN (Z-PATH) 
In Joseph Maxwell’s (1941) Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive 
Approach, five key elements comprise a qualitative research design: the goals, the 
conceptual framework, the research questions, the specific methods (for data collection, 
filtering, and analysis), and the validation. Each of these components of a qualitative 
research design reflexively informs on and interacts with each other to collectively refine 
the entire research process (see Figure 18). The design of a qualitative study is well suited 
to exploratory studies that must adapt in response to changes in circumstances and the 
nature of the information revealed by the research. As each component evolves, the entire 
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model should adjust to appropriately reflect these refinements across the entire research 
methodology.  
 
Figure 18.   Qualitative Research Design for This Study (from Maxwell, 1941) 
1. Goals 
Numerous goals converged in the development of this study. The various personal 
goals of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) researchers, the goals of Naval Sea 
Logistics Command (NSLC) staff as the sponsoring command, the goals of the NPS 
advising faculty, and the goals of a prior NPS researcher and graduate (Gregory B. 
Storer) worked in concert to benefit this research effort. The primary goals are the 
following: 
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 Confirm whether the decisions and corresponding results, which related to 
the Virginia-class program, translated to other, similar programs (Storer, 
2012). 
 Expand personal knowledge while simultaneously expanding the body of 
knowledge related to DOD acquisition (NPS researchers and advisors). 
 Assist U.S. Navy interests in further reducing costs by studying 
interactions in DOD acquisitions that may affect affordability (NPS 
researchers and advisors). 
 Assist in bridging any possible knowledge gaps between academia and 
business stakeholders with regard to DOD acquisition to increase the value 
of this MBA capstone project (NPS researchers and advisors). 
 Explore whether any generalizable correlations appear regarding 
affordability outcomes, when compared to consistent patterns of enablers 
and decisions for Virginia-class and San Antonio-class programs (NSLC 
sponsor, NPS researchers, and NPS advisors). 
 Find valuable areas for future studies of affordability (NPS researchers). 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Experience in the military, even with additional studies of DOD acquisition, is no 
substitute for direct expertise. The expertise of NPS faculty advisors and the inputs from 
the sponsor assisted in the ongoing refinement of the conceptual framework of this 
qualitative research design. This framework evolved significantly as the research 
progressed. Ultimately, two factors emerged as the narratives of the Virginia-class and 
San Antonio-class programs were repeatedly examined: enablers and decisions.  
 Enablers were defined as those circumstances (e.g., events, cultural 
norms, or conditions that are otherwise difficult to control) or managerial 
tools (e.g., meetings, cross functional teams, reporting processes, or 
conditions that are otherwise easy to regulate) that influence decisions and 
are likely to bias the program toward or away from affordability.  
 Decisions were defined as those choices aimed at influencing the triple 




Although some overlap does exist between these two types of influencing factors, 
the definition of decisions was further constrained by the degree and precision apparent 
in their intent. If enough of the narrative information gathered could be generalized to 
these two categories, then the interactions between them and their effects on affordability 
were examined in sequence for this research. These factors begin to suggest relationships 
with affordability and should be considered for future study. 
3. Research Questions 
Research questions emerged naturally from the conceptual framework but 
required repetitive review for precision and simplification. The original questions began 
with general inquiries, which evolved and ultimately led to a refinement of the conceptual 
original framework. The model for qualitative research is a highly iterative process. The 
evolution of these questions and others, in combination with this study’s ongoing 
research, led to a continuous process of improvements in this methodology. 
One such early research question was, “How do (should) we define 
affordability?” This question led to similar questions such as, “How does DOD 
acquisition leadership define affordability” and “How is affordability legally defined?” 
Curiously, our research suggested that none of the answers precisely matched one 
another, and none of the publications researched expressed the answers in a manner that 




Figure 19.  Example Concept Map for Affordability Questions 
Without a consistent definition of affordability, there would be no way of validly 
comparing these programs, either with each other (across vessel type) or within their 
various periods (across time). The development of the primary research question 
depended on this subordinate question and on its answers (which are noted in the 
introduction of the exploration and comparison section). Similar questions, such as 
“What is an enabler,” “What is a decision,” and “How do we know when they matter,” all 
manifested from the iterative process of research and inquiry and finally led to the 
primary research question.  
This study seeks to answer the following primary question: What common and/or 
disparate mix of enablers and decisions apparently drives affordability in the pre-






A structured approach was selected to maximize comparability within the data, 
across vessel types and across time. Additionally, by establishing consistent categories 
for processes, interactions, and outcomes through which the narratives of the Virginia-
class program and San Antonio-class program were interpreted, more stable 
generalizations were possible. The data was therefore gathered, filtered, and analyzed 
through the lens of the primary research question and focused on apparent enablers and 
decisions.  
The public nature of MDAPs and the numerous legislative requirements for the 
data archival of DOD acquisition programs ensured a broad range of source data 
available in the research of the Virginia-class and San Antonio-class programs. At all 
levels (congressional, program office, contractor, mass media, etc.), both the successes 
and the challenges relative to the Virginia-class and San Antonio-class programs were 
recorded, along with their specific corresponding circumstances, decisions, and costs. 
The Congressional Research Service (CRS), the GAO, the U.S. Inspector General, the 
RAND Corporation, and several other independent sources have all published reports on 
these programs, including details that reflect the sources of cost growth and the 
effectiveness of various cost-reduction efforts. Additionally, cost data was available from 
sources of public record designated For Official Use Only (FOUO), including DAMIR 
and VAMOSC (see Figure 20). 
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Figure 20.  Example Concept Map for Data Sources and Triangulation 
 The narrative information for both programs was collected and then 
evaluated in conjunction with the cost details from DAMIR and 
VAMOSC to determine credibility and criticality. Once a dependable 
representation of what happened relative to the pre-acquisition, 
acquisition, and sustainment periods was established, grouped categories 
of enablers and decisions were created from the major elements within 
these periods. These enablers and decisions were then evaluated in relation 
to their cumulative effects on affordability within the pre-acquisition, 
acquisition, and sustainment periods.  
  Those outcomes on affordability, which were the same across both 





 Those outcomes on affordability, which were apparently different across 
both programs and shared apparently different enablers and decisions, 
were noteworthy. 
Three types of valid findings are depicted in Table 26. This analysis of the data 
culminated in one summary finding for each period.  
 





Enablers Decisions Outcome Finding Explanations
Same Same Same Yes
If all the same then 
outcome should match
Same Different Same No
Differing decision 
should not result in the 
same outcome, no 
apparent finding
Different Same Same No
Differing enablers 
should not result in the 
same decision or 
outcomes, no apparent 
finding
Different Different Same No
No significance can be 
drawn/no means of 
comparison
Same Different Different Yes
Looking for which 
different decisions lead 
to different outcomes
Different Same Different Yes
Different enablers that 
lead to the same 
decision but different 
outcome are significant
Same Same Different No
No significance can be 
drawn/source of 
difference could not be 
determined
Different Different Different No
No significance can be 




 Although the validation process is the tail-end consideration of this model 
in qualitative research design, it significantly affected the methods portion 
of this study’s design. Each inspection of the validation step reprised and 
refined numerous aspects of the methods step, in the pursuit of greater and 
greater degrees of validity. The following traditional strategies in 
qualitative research design were used (Maxwell, 1941): 
 Triangulation: to minimize both researcher bias and source bias, to assist 
through examination, and to promote comprehensive generalizations. 
 Quasi-statistics: to corroborate narratives via cross-comparisons between 
textual representations and numerical changes and to measure cost related 
outcomes (measures of affordability). 
 Comparison between groups: to maximize an understanding of apparent 
similarities and differences. 













VIII. JOINT SUMMARY 
By comparing enablers and decisions in the Virginia-class and the San Antonio-
class programs, this study seeks consistent cause-and-effect relationships that are likely to 
improve affordability. In this study, affordability relates to both cost growth prevention 
and total ownership cost reduction. These findings are not comprehensive with respect to 
the programs in their entirety; rather, they are comprehensive within the limitations of 
data available in the public domain. These limitations include information that is not 
proprietary, information that is not censored due to security, and the incomplete current 
immaturity of the sustainment costs (i.e., less than one fifth of operational life cycle 
expended). 
Enablers and decisions are categorized by the consistency of their effect on cost. 
Enablers include events, policies, management tools, current cultural norms, and 
environmental conditions. Decisions include those choices that appear to have resulted in 
both favorable and unfavorable cost changes. 
A. PRE-ACQUISITION 
This section explains the relationships between enablers and decisions and their 
effects on affordability relative to the pre-acquisition stage of the Virginia-class 
submarine and San Antonio-class ship. These tables conceptually depict the cause-and-
effect relationships using available data extracted from preceding sections. These 
enablers and their interactions with decisions are addressed from a qualitative 
perspective. In some cases, as few as two data points were used to establish a relationship 
between an enabler and decision.  
From the outset, the Virginia-class and San Antonio-class had enablers and 
decisions that affected affordability in a positive and negative manner. For example, 
decisions that accepted a high level of expected risk might completely counter efforts to 
control cost. The relationships between these enablers and decisions will eventually affect 




Table 27.   Pre-Acquisition Enablers and Decisions 
1. Example Enablers 
In both the Virginia-class and San Antonio-class programs, leadership had 
developed an insensitivity to production breaks between platforms. In the case of naval 
submarine construction, a 14-month gap existed between the USS Connecticut (SSN 22) 
and USS Jimmy Carter, more than two years prior to the laying of the keel for the first 
Virginia-class submarine. Additionally, a six-year lapse occurred between new submarine 
commissioning in the U.S. In the case of naval amphibious transport construction, a 46-
month gap existed between the launch of the USS Pearl Harbor (LSD-52; a similar 
platform) and the laying of the keel for the first San Antonio-class ship. The antecedent 
platform for the San Antonio-class—the Austin-class—was launched in 1970. This 
represents a span of 30 years between these two ship classes. Production breaks increased 
the risk of cost growth in several areas. Refer to Table 27. 
In both the Virginia-class and San Antonio-class programs, IPTs were employed 
early and throughout both programs. IPTs were employed by both the program offices 
and by the contracted shipyards to minimize rework and control cost. The collaboration 
that IPTs fostered between stakeholders that were previously competitors (General 
Dynamics and Newport News), and between the Navy and the shipbuilders, were not 
present in antecedent classes. The integration of the San Antonio-class program office 




Greater Risk of Cost 
Growth Insensitivity to Production Break Cost‐Plus Contracts
SAN ANTONIO 
(Ship)
Greater Risk of Cost 
Growth Insensitivity to Production Break Cost‐Plus Contracts
VIRGINIA 
(Submarine) Better Cost Control Integrated Product Teams (IPT) Mature Technology
SAN ANTONIO 






Cumulative Effect on 
Affordability
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to innovations intended to reduce cost. By employing these IPTs, the San Antonio-class 
program was able to de-conflict design challenges early in the construction phase. Refer 
to Table 27. 
2. Example Decisions 
In both the Virginia-class and San Antonio-class programs, cost-plus contracts 
were awarded. These contracts placed a disproportionate amount of risk on the USG and, 
ultimately, the taxpayer, in comparison to the prime contractor. This form of contract is 
common in the early phases of naval construction of a platform. Cost-plus contracts like 
these are used to protect the contractor’s ability to make a reasonable profit, thus 
preserving vital portions of the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and ensuring the USG 
ability to acquire current and future vessels. Refer to Table 27. 
In both the Virginia-class and San Antonio-class programs, a herculean effort was 
made from the outset to maximize the use of mature technology in the design of these 
vessels. Lessons learned from previous MDAPs led to the DOD acquisition reforms that 
encouraged these program offices to use mature technology to reduce rework and control 
cost. In the specific case of the Virginia-class, any potentially immature technology that 
had not been previously employed but was required to meet program goals was first 
tested and demonstrated on Los Angeles-class submarines prior to insertion into the 
Virginia-class program. The program office of the San Antonio-class used the AN/SPS-
73, air-search RADAR, to reduce the risk of cost growth and promote lower sustainment 
costs. The AN/SPS-73 RADAR was chosen over all other air-search RADAR suites 
because of its lower manpower and maintenance requirements over the life of the 
employment. Refer to Table 27. 
B. ACQUISITION 
As the Virginia-class and San Antonio-class programs transitioned from the pre-
acquisition to the acquisition period, the cumulative effect of all enablers and decisions 
from the pre-acquisition period resulted in cost growth. These enablers and decisions 
carried over a higher risk of further cost growth into the engineering and manufacturing 
development (EMD) phase. Additional enablers and decisions within the acquisition 
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period were used in response to the cost growth incurred in the pre-acquisition period. 
Table 28 refers to acquisition enablers and decisions. 
 
Table 28.   Acquisition Enablers and Decisions 
1. Example Enablers 
In both the Virginia-class and San Antonio-class programs, multiple Nunn–
McCurdy breaches occurred. Cost and schedule breaches continued to mount in both 
programs and further cost growth ultimately led to critical cost breaches in these 
programs. A critical cost breach is a current UCR 50% above original UCR as listed in 
the APB, or 25% above current UCR. The Nunn–McCurdy breaches typically 
necessitated a decision to reduce costs, rebaseline the cost or schedule thresholds, or 
cancel of the program. Refer to Table 28. 
2. Example Decisions 
As these programs proceeded through production, cost growth continued to 
mount; the most significant difference between them was the decision of how to respond 
to the Nunn–McCurdy critical cost breach that each program experienced (Virginia-class 
in 2005 and San Antonio-class in 2001). Refer to Table 28. 
In the Virginia-class following the Nunn–McCurdy critical cost breach (50% 
above original UCR in APB, or 25% above current UCR), the shift to a target-costing 
methodology appears to have been the catalyst for the innovations that have overcome 
cost growth to date since the last breach. The critical cost breach led to the threat of 
program cancellation. The stakeholders of the Virginia-class program decided to reduce 
















Critical Cost Nunn‐McCurdy Breach
Cumulative Effect on 
Affordability
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be attributed to target costing as the workforce maturation process was already making 
gains with the construction of each additional hull. Refer to Table 28. 
The San Antonio-class program responded by broadening and adding to ongoing 
RTOC initiatives, as well as rebaselining the UCR. The San Antonio-class acquisition 
costs (Sailaway cost, APUC, PAUC) all continued to increase. Refer to Table 28. 
In contrast, the Virginia-class program faced the possibility of cancellation. In 
response to the mandate by the CNO to reduce acquisition costs, the program office and 
the contractor acquired assistance from the BAH consulting group in pursuit of additional 
affordability. The new approach that emerged from this collaboration resembled a target-
costing methodology. The Virginia-class acquisition costs were substantially reduced as a 
result of the implementation of innovations conceived from this paradigm.  
C. SUSTAINMENT 
As the Virginia-class and San Antonio-class programs transitioned from the 
acquisition to the sustainment period, the cumulative effect of all enablers and decisions 
from the prior periods pre-determined the affordability of the O&S component that will 
play out over the systems operating life. The cumulative results from the enablers and 
decisions that carried over into the sustainment period, however, the effectiveness of 
these decisions on the total and final sustainment cost will not be known for several 
decades. Based on current production quantities and schedules for these programs, the 
sustainment period of both programs is less than one-third complete. Table 29 refers to 
sustainment enablers and decisions. 
 




Appears Effective Reduction of Drydock by 1
SAN ANTONIO 
(Ship) Inconclusive Titanium Piping
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1. Example Enablers 
In both the Virginia-class and San Antonio-class programs, multiple incorporated 
RTOC initiatives were implemented. These initiatives spanned both the pre-acquisition 
and acquisition periods with the intent of reducing TOC in the sustainment period. RTOC 
initiatives were comprised of multiple potential innovations derived as a product of the 
IPTs. These initiatives included, but were not limited to the following: the use of COTS, 
replacement of high-failure parts, and reduction of crew maintenance hours. Refer to 
Table 29. 
2. Example Decisions 
The different decisions made in the Virginia-class and San Antonio-class across 
both the pre-acquisition and acquisition periods appear to have disparate results in the 
two classes studied.  
In the Virginia-class, a reduction of scheduled dry-dock periods by one appears to 
positively contribute to the reduction of cost growth through the sustainment period. This 
determination is described previously in the Operations and Support section of this 
report, and visually depicted in Figure 13. However, it must be noted that the 
determination of whether the program cost reductions were effective is based on the 
realization of less than one fifth of the entire projected sustainment period for the 
Virginia-class. The initial cost trend is known and supports the determination that the 
Virginia-class efforts were effective in reducing costs in comparison to the antecedent 
classes. Refer to Table 29. 
In the San Antonio-class, it appears that the decision to use titanium piping in 
some of the systems will contribute to the reduction of cost growth through the 
sustainment period. However, the results are inconclusive as to whether the San Antonio-
class cost-reduction efforts were effective, on the basis of less than one fifth of the entire 
projected sustainment period for the San Antonio-class. Since the antecedent program is 
significantly older than the San Antonio-class and VAMOSC did not have the initial 
sustainment cost of that program, the findings for the San Antonio-class are inconclusive. 
See Figure 16.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
In the exploration of the DOD acquisition of amphibious transports and 
submarines with regard to affordability in acquisition and sustainment, this study has 
found enough apparent consistency in cause-and-effect relationships to suggest that these 
programs can be credibly compared to one another. The significant similarities and 
differences reflected in the previously discussed findings merit further study of more 
granular data (to track down to subsystem and component levels) over a longer period of 
sustainment. By improving the understanding of the detailed interactions involved in 
these cause-and-effect relationships, decision-makers can improve the likelihood of 
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IX. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Ship and submarine programs differ significantly in their construction, 
technology, and management. Despite these many differences, by grouping enablers and 
decisions into general categories that relate to chronology and function, potential cause-
and-effect relationships become more apparent. The enablers and decisions of these 
disparate programs can be grouped in numerous ways. This study pursued groupings that 
captured the greatest degree of commonality between these programs. By creating highly 
analogous categories, likely relationships and areas for future inquiry were more easily 
targeted. 
A. FINDINGS 
The greatest commonality between all DOD acquisition programs is that they are 
managed using the DOD 5000 series Process Life Cycle Framework. This study 
categorizes enablers and decisions chronologically. Because earlier periods determine 
latter outcomes, this study grouped enablers and decisions primarily based on the period 
they affect. The three categories used in these findings are pre- acquisition, acquisition, 
and sustainment. This study used Milestone B as a general dividing point, in order to 
properly differentiate between initial acquisition (e.g., planning, source selection, design), 
which acts as the foundation upon which the program is built, and the portion of 
acquisition where cost growth is realized and responded to. These groupings are not 
absolute; rather, they are used as a means of comparison. 
As noted in the methodology section, this study’s findings of apparent 
significance derived from similarities or differences in outcomes that were consistent 
with similarities or differences in enablers and decisions. Table 30 shows three types of 
patterns between enablers, decisions, and outcomes that this study determined to indicate 




Table 30.   Enabler, Decision, Outcome Pattern 
1. Pre-acquisition (Finding Type 1) 
The following are common enablers for both ships and submarines for the pre-
acquisition stage: 
 insensitivity to production break, 
 culture of affordability, 
 learning atrophy, 
 source selection constraints, 
 PM affordability goals, 
 EVMS, 
 enhanced schedule management, 
 IPPD, 
 IPT, and 




Type Enablers Decisions Outcome Finding Explanations
1 Same Same Same Yes
If all the same then 
outcome should match
2 Same Different Different Yes
Looking for which 
different decisions lead to 
different outcomes
3 Different Same Different Yes
Different enablers that 
lead to the same decision 
but different outcome are 
significant
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The following are common decisions for both ships and submarines for the pre-
acquisition stage: 
 stop production of platform, 
 merged mission requirements of multiple prior platforms, 
 at least one inexperienced builder, 
 cost-plus contract (risk on USG), 
 single-source for design and build, 
 use of mature technology, 
 optimized manning, 
 better drawings, and 
 pursued innovation. 
The following are the common outcomes for both ships and submarines for the 
pre-acquisition stage: 
 these programs faced significant cost growth, leading to Nunn–McCurdy 
critical cost breach (>50% original baseline or >25% over current 
baseline) and 
 these programs faced significant schedule delay. 
From the inception of these programs, DOD acquisition leaders managed enablers 
and made decisions in a manner that either accepted the risk of cost growth (i.e., cost-plus 
contracts) or sought to mitigate the risk of cost growth (i.e., use of mature technology). 
The enablers and decisions common to both programs, as listed above, even when 
combined, resulted in cost growth. This study finds no conclusive evidence in these 
programs that the listed enablers and decisions intended to minimize cost were effective 
when compared to the enablers and decisions that were inherently accepting of a higher 
risk of cost growth. The cost growth was so significant in comparison to estimates that it 
exceeded the identifiable benefits of the enablers and decisions intended to control cost 
growth. 
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a. Finding 1  
The combination of production break in platform, cost-plus contracts, low 
experience contractors, and increased complexity due to merged missions resulted in a 
degree of cost growth which could not be overcome by enablers and decisions intended to 
reduce costs. 
2. Acquisition (Finding Type 2) 
The following are common enablers for both ships and submarines for the 
acquisition stage: 
 Nunn–McCurdy critical cost breach, 
 schedule delay, 
 labor complications, 
 PM affordability goals, 
 IPT, 
 enhanced CAD, 
 Lean/Six Sigma, 
 implementation of RTOC, and 
 culture of affordability, 
 The following are the different decisions for both ships and submarines for 
the acquisition stage: 
 CNO ultimatum [SUB], 
 contractor target costing shift [SUB], 
 program rebaseline [SHIP], and 
 additional cost reduction initiatives [SHIP]. 
 The following are the different outcomes for both ships and submarines 
for the acquisition stage: 
 costs significantly reduced for acquisition [SUB] and 
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 no conclusive evidence of significantly reduced acquisition cost [SHIP]. 
As these programs proceeded through production, cost growth continued to 
mount; the most significant difference between them was the decision of how to respond 
to the Nunn–McCurdy critical cost breach (Virginia-class in 2005 and San Antonio-class 
in 2001) that each program experienced. The San Antonio-class program responded by 
broadening and adding to ongoing RTOC initiatives, as well as rebaselining the UCR. 
The San Antonio-class acquisition costs (Sailaway cost, APUC, PAUC) all continued to 
increase. In contrast, the Virginia-class program faced the possibility of cancellation. In 
response to the mandate by the CNO to reduce acquisition costs, the program office and 
the contractor acquired assistance from the BAH consulting group in pursuit of additional 
affordability. The new approach that emerged from this collaboration resembled a target-
costing methodology. The Virginia-class acquisition costs were substantially reduced as a 
result of the implementation of innovations conceived from this paradigm.  
a. Finding 2  
The most significant decision of the Virginia-class program consistent with the 
reduced costs realized by the program, as contrasted with the San Antonio-class program, 
was the use of a methodology by the program office, Electric Boat, and BAH that 
resembled target costing.  
3. Sustainment Initiatives (Finding Type 2) 
The following are the common enablers for both ships and submarines relative to 
the sustainment stage: 
 culture of affordability, 
 PM affordability goals, 
 IPT, 
 enhanced CAD, 
 Lean/Six Sigma, and 
 implementation of RTOC.  
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The following are the different decisions for ships and submarines relative to the 
sustainment stage:  
 extended period between dry docks [SUB], 
 more mature implementation of RTOC process [SUB], and 
 pilot program for DOD acquisition reform initiatives (RTOC) [SHIP]. 
The following are the different outcomes for ships and submarines relative to the 
sustainment stage: 
 VAMOSC reflects reduced sustainment costs in comparison to Los 
Angeles-class and Seawolf-class submarines [SUB]. 
 VAMOSC shows no conclusive evidence of significantly reduced 
sustainment costs in comparison to the Austin-class amphibious transport 
ship [SHIP]. 
As previously stated, less than one fifth of the sustainment period has been 
expended. The sustainment cost-related findings are preliminary. Although this study 
highlights the apparent success of the Virginia-class program in attaining greater 
affordability than its predecessors, sustainment costs of the San Antonio-class appear to 
be equivalent with its most recent predecessor. The two most significant points of 
difference in the case of the Virginia-class program derived from the decision to extend 
the period between dry docks and the degree to which reductions in total ownership cost 
were pursued. The lessons learned in the continuing development of DOD acquisitions 
reform initiatives within the San Antonio-class program appear to have contributed to the 
success of the Virginia-class program RTOC sustainment initiatives.  
a. Finding 3  
The current sustainment cost data (VAMOSC) suggests that the programmatic 




This research extends the NPS thesis, Virginia Class Cost Reduction: Achieving 
Savings in Submarine Acquisition, written by Gregory B. Storer in June 2012 as well as 
the Virginia-class and San Antonio-class studies published by the CRS, CBO, GAO, and 
RAND, all noted in the References section. Additionally, these findings establish a basis 
for further study, which will more completely explain and define the relationships 
between the programmatic enablers and decisions of DOD acquisition and cost 
(affordability). As these two MDAPs proceed further through the operations and support 
period (sustainment), an increasing pool of data will continue to emerge that will provide 
researchers and leaders a higher degree of confidence in the correlation between 
programmatic efforts to reduce ownership costs and the relevant cost outcomes within the 
operational environment. This study reaffirms two recommendations provided by Storer 
(2012): 
 Update this research in the future to provide definitive evidence of cost 
savings after more actual cost data has been returned from Block III [and 
IV] ship construction. Use additional analysis techniques, possibly 
involving multivariate analysis to project costs from a continuation of 
Block I & II ship construction and compare with the updated data. (p. 56) 
 Perform an in-depth case study with more extensive field interviews of the 
Virginia-class class program as a whole. Develop lessons learned and best 
practices that can be applied extensively to other programs. This will aid 
in institutionalizing the aspects of the Virginia-class program that can be 
most beneficial to major defense acquisition programs beyond just 
submarine construction or other shipbuilding. (p. 56) 
 In addition, this study recommends NPS students and other researchers 
investigate this body of knowledge further in the following areas: 
 Refine and/or revise this research by quantitatively analyzing the 
interactions and outcomes noted in the pre-acquisition findings of this 
study. Specifically, use the RAND methodology, “Root Cause Analysis of 
Nunn-McCurdy Breaches,” to quantitatively describe the relationships 
between the enablers and decisions included in the launch of Virginia-
class and San Antonio-class programs and their cost outcomes. 
(Blickstein, I., 2012) 
 Develop a case study outlining the efforts by the Virginia-class program 
office, Electric Boat, and Booz Allen Hamilton that resulted in significant 
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reductions in the Virginia-class costs. A richer understanding of those 
decisions which led to the greatest cost reductions will improve DOD 
acquisition best practices and policies. 
 Develop a case study of the Virginia-class sustainment initiatives, which 
currently reflect a significant improvement in affordability as compared to 
previous DOD submarine platforms.  
 Develop a supplemental extension of the sustainment initiative case study 
noted above, which quantitatively analyzes the marginal changes between 
cost, schedule, and performance (KPPs and KSAs), projected and actual 
(to the degree sustainment costs are available), resulting from the 
implementation of each programmatic change to the Virginia-class. 
C. AFTERWORD 
In the exploration of the DOD acquisition of amphibious transports and 
submarines with regard to affordability in acquisition and sustainment, this study has 
found enough apparent consistency in cause-and-effect relationships to suggest that these 
programs can be credibly compared to one another. The significant similarities and 
differences reflected in these findings merit further study. By improving the 
understanding of the detailed interactions involved in these cause-and-effect 
relationships, decision-makers have a greater likelihood of developing more affordable 




APPENDIX A. VAMOSC 
 
Figure A-1: Front Page of VAMOSC Web-Portal (VAMOSC, n.d.) 
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Figure A-3: Query Output Page of VAMOSC Web-Portal (VAMOSC, n.d. 
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APPENDIX B. DAMIR 
 




Figure B-2: Front Page of DAMIR Web-Portal (DAMIR, n.d.) 
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APPENDIX C. JIC 
 
Figure C-1: Query Creation Worksheet for Joint Inflation Calculator (JIC) 




Element from this 
List  
3. Enter Base/Input Year(1970 - 2060) 2013
A.  Select Inflation Type from List   
B.  Enter Output/Target Year    1996




Years 2013          1996
Escalation Type FY/Constant$         FY/Constant$
100.0                                   0.6105 61.0                              
10,000.0                              0.6105 6,104.7                          
100,000.0                            0.6105 61,046.6                        
1,000.0                                0.6105 610.5                             
1,000.0                                0.6105 610.5                             
1,000.0                                0.6105 610.5                             
Return to Main
Quick Look
O&MN (COMPOSITE) Operations & Maintenance, Navy (1804)
Enter starting values in the blue input cells.  
The inflation factor (based on your selected 
appropriation, year, and type) is applied and 
the results given in the output column
               Optional - For Quick Look, complete steps A, B & C below
Marine Corps 
ARMY  NAVY 
Generate Inflation Table Go To SAR Calculator 
Worksheet 
DoD Wide 
Inflation Query Sheet 
O&MN (COMPOSITE) Operations & Maintenance, Navy (1804)
FY/Constant $  to  FY/Constant $
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Figure C-2: Inflation Index Table Worksheet for Joint Inflation Calculator (JIC)  
















1970 7.07% 0.1467 0.1472 0.1461
1971 6.10% 0.1557 0.1562 0.1550 6.08%
1972 5.86% 0.1648 0.1654 0.1641 5.91%
1973 4.16% 0.1717 0.1738 0.1725 5.10%
1974 9.99% 0.1888 0.1927 0.1912 10.87%
1975 14.71% 0.2166 0.2181 0.2164 13.16%
1976 7.50% 0.2328 0.2342 0.2324 7.40%
197T 2.42% 0.2385 0.2419 0.2401 3.29%
1977 5.75% 0.2522 0.2547 0.2528 5.29%
1978 7.37% 0.2708 0.2745 0.2724 7.76%
1979 8.95% 0.2950 0.2999 0.2975 9.24% Top
1980 21.98% 0.3598 0.3690 0.3661 23.05%
1981 10.71% 0.3984 0.4055 0.4023 9.89%
1982 7.22% 0.4271 0.4319 0.4285 6.51%
1983 2.55% 0.4380 0.4417 0.4383 2.27%
1984 1.65% 0.4453 0.4494 0.4459 1.74%
1985 2.48% 0.4563 0.4601 0.4565 2.38%
1986 0.35% 0.4579 0.4626 0.4590 0.54%
1987 1.82% 0.4663 0.4717 0.4680 1.97%
1988 1.82% 0.4747 0.4811 0.4773 1.99%
1989 3.76% 0.4926 0.4995 0.4956 3.82%
1990 3.29% 0.5088 0.5160 0.5119 3.30%
1991 8.48% 0.5519 0.5572 0.5528 7.98%
1992 1.58% 0.5606 0.5648 0.5603 1.36%
1993 3.14% 0.5782 0.5808 0.5762 2.83%
1994 2.24% 0.5912 0.5938 0.5892 2.25%
1995 1.06% 0.5975 0.6001 0.5955 1.06%
1996 2.18% 0.6105 0.6128 0.6080 2.10%
1997 2.21% 0.6239 0.6252 0.6203 2.03% Top
1998 2.68% 0.6407 0.6426 0.6376 2.78%
O&MN (COMPOSITE) Operations & Maintenance, Navy 
(1804) Return to Main
Go to Query
This sheet holds the inflation table 
most recently generated from the 
Query sheet. 
 
The Inflation Rate is the inflation 
that occurred since the prior year. 
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APPENDIX D. ADDITIONAL GRAPHS 
 











Figure D-3: Seawolf-Class Cumulative Cost Distribution, Averaged Across All Vessels (after VAMOSC, n.d.) 
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APPENDIX E. EVMS 






























  Cost Efficiency  CPI   =  BCWP / ACWP  Favorable is > 1.0, Unfavorable is < 1.0 
  Schedule Efficiency  SPI   =  BCWP / BCWS  Favorable is > 1.0, Unfavorable is < 1.0 
ESTIMATE @ COMPLETION  = ACTUALS TO DATE + [ (REMAINING WORK) / (PERFORMANCE 
FACTOR) ] 
  EACCPI  =        ACWPCUM   +  [ (BAC – BCWPCUM) / CPICUM  ] 
  EACComposite  =        ACWPCUM   +  [ (BAC – BCWPCUM) / (CPICUM * SPICUM) ] 
 
TO COMPLETE PERFORMANCE INDEX (TCPI) §  #  
  TCPITarget  =  Work Remaining / Cost Remaining = (BAC – BCWPCUM) / (Target – ACWPCUM) 
 
   §  To Determine the TCPI  for BAC, LRE, or EAC       Substitute TARGET with BAC, LRE, or EAC 
   #  To Determine the Contract Level TCPI for EAC, You May Replace BAC with TAB 
OVERALL STATUS 
  % Schedule  =  (BCWSCUM   /  BAC) * 100 
  % Complete  =  (BCWPCUM   /  BAC) * 100 
  % Spent  =  (ACWPCUM   /  BAC) * 100 
VARIANCES   Positive is Favorable, Negative is Unfavorable 
  Cost Variance  CV  =  BCWP  –  ACWP  
  CV %  =  (CV / BCWP)  * 100  
  Schedule Variance  SV  =  BCWP  –  BCWS  
  SV %  =  (SV / BCWS)  * 100 
  Variance at Completion  VAC  =  BAC  –  EAC  
  VAC %  =  (VAC / BAC)   * 100 
BASELINE EXECUTION INDEX  (BEI)  &  Hit Task % 
  BEI  = Total Tasks Completed / (Total Tasks with Baseline Finish On or Prior to Current Report Period) 
  Hit  Task %  =  100 * (Tasks Completed ON or PRIOR to Baseline Finish / Tasks Baselined to Finish  
                           within Current Report Period) 
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Figure E-2: “Gold Card” provided from Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
website: https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=19577  
ACRONYMS 
ACWP Actual Cost of Work Performed  Cost actually incurred in accomplishing work performed  = ACTUAL COST 
AUW  Authorized Unpriced Work  Work contractually approved, but not yet negotiated / definitized 
BAC  Budget At Completion  Total budget for total contract thru any given level 
BCWP Budgeted Cost for Work Performed  Value of completed work in terms of the work’s assigned budget = EARNED VALUE 
BCWS Budgeted Cost for Work Scheduled  Time-phased Budget Plan for work currently scheduled  = PLANNED VALUE 
CA  Control Account  Lowest CWBS element assigned to a single focal point to plan & control  
    scope / schedule / budget 
CBB  Contract Budget Base  Sum of NCC & AUW 
EAC  Estimate At Completion  Estimate of total Cost for total contract thru any given level generated by  
    Ktr, PMO, DCMA, etc. = EACKtr / PMO / DCMA 
LRE  Latest Revised Estimate  Ktr’s EAC or EACKtr 
MR  Management Reserve  Budget withheld by Ktr PM for unknowns / risk management 
NCC  Negotiated Contract Cost  Contract Price Minus profit or fee(s) 
OTB  Over Target Baseline  Sum of CBB + additional budget approved for remaining work 
PAC  Price At Completion  EAC Plus Adjusted Profit or Fee(s) 
PMB  Performance Measurement Baseline  Contract time-phased budget plan 
PP  Planning Package  Far-term CA activities not yet defined into WPs 
SLPP  Summary Level Planning Package  Far-term contract activities not yet defined into CAs  
TAB  Total Allocated Budget  Sum of all budgets for work on contract = NCC, CBB, or OTB  
TCPI  To Complete Performance Index  Efficiency needed from ‘time now’ to achieve a Cost Target = BAC, LRE, or EAC 
UB  Undistributed Budget  Broadly defined activities not yet distributed to CAs or SLPPs  
WP  Work Package  Near-term, detail-planned activities within a CA  
 
EVM POLICY:  Interim DoDI 5000.02, Enclosure 1. Table 8.   
  EVMS in accordance with ANSI/EIA-748 is required for cost or incentive contracts, subcontracts, intra-government 
work agreements, & other agreements valued > $20M (TY $). Contracts > $50M (TY $) require that the EVMS be formally 
validated by the cognizant contracting officer.  
  EVM is discouraged on Firm-Fixed Price, Time & Material Contracts, & LOE activities regardless of cost. 
  Refer to the IPMR Implementation Guide for IPMR Tailoring Guidance. 
 
DoD’s EVM CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS: 
 DFARS CLAUSES   252.234-7001 
“NOTICE OF EVMS” FOR SOLICITATIONS 
        252.234-7002 “EVMS” FOR SOLICITATIONS & CONTRACTS 
     252.242-7005 
“CONTRACTOR BUSINESS SYSTEMS” FOR SOLICITATIONS & CONTRACTS 
  CONTRACT PERFORMANCE REPORT  DI-MGMT-81466A  5 FORMATS =  WBS, ORGANIZATION, BASELINE, STAFFING, EXPLANATIONS & 
PROB ANALYSES 
  INTEGRATED MASTER SCHEDULE  DI-MGMT-81650     MANDATORY FOR DOD EVMS CONTRACTS 
  Integrated Program Mngt Report  DI-MGMT-81861 *   7 FORMATS = WBS, OBS / IPT, BASELINE, STAFFING, EXPLANATIONS & 
PROB ANALYSES,     
                                                                   IM S, HISTORY / FORECAST COST 
  INTEGRATED BASELINE REVIEW  MANDATORY FOR ALL EVMS CONTRACTS 
  WBS For Defense Materiel Items  MIL-STD-881-C  
     * Combines & Supersedes DI-MGMT-81466A & 81650; Effective July 1, 2012 
  Work Packages (WP)   Planning Packages (PP) 
Control  
 Accounts (CA)  
Undistributed 
Budget (UB) 
  Summary Level  
  Planning Packages (SLPP)  
  OVERRUN  
  AUW  
  NCC  
  OTB  
CBB     
TAB 
 Contract Price  
  PMB   Management 
Reserve (MR) 
  Profit / Fees  
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